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Transformation of Europe
INTRODUcTION
In 1951, France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries concluded the
Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Lofty in
its aspirations, and innovative in some of its institutional arrangements, this
polity was perceived, by the actors themselves-as well as by the developers
of an impressive academic theoretical apparatus, who were quick to perceive
events-as an avant garde international organization ushering forth a new
model for transnational discourse. Very quickly, however, reality dissipated the
dream, and again quickly following events, the academic apparatus was aban-
doned.'
Forty years later, the European Community is a transformed polity. It now
comprises twelve Member States, has a population of 340 million citizens, and
constitutes the largest trading bloc in the world. But the notion of "transforma-
tion" surely comes from changes deeper than its geography and demography.
That Europe has been transformed in a more radical fashion is difficult to
doubt. Indeed, in the face of that remarkable (and often lucrative) growth
industry, 1992 commentary, doubt may be construed as subversion.
The surface manifestations of this alleged transformation are legion, ranging
(in the eyes of the beholder, of course) from the trivial and ridiculous2 to the
important and sublime. Consider the changes in the following:
(1) the scope of Community action. Notice how naturally the Member
States and their Western allies have turned to the Community to
take the lead role in assisting the development and reconstruction
of Eastern Europe.3 A mere decade or two ago, such an overt for-
I. For a review of Integration Theory and its demise, see, e.g., Greilsammer, Theorizing European
Integration In its Four Periods, 2 JERUSALEM J. INT'L REL. 129 (1976); Krislov, Ehlermarm & Weiler, The
Political Organs and the Decision-Making Process jn the United States and the European Community, in
2:1 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 3, 6-11 (1986).
2. The winning song in the popular Eurovision Song contest last year was entitled "Altogether 1992."
The Times (London), May 7, 1990 at 6, col. 8.
3. See European Commission Defines A General Framework for Association Agreements ("European
Agreements") Between the EEC and the Countries of Eastern and Central Europe, EUROPE DOC. (No.
1646/47) 1 (Sept. 7, 1990) (reprint of Commission communication to Council and Parliament).
The evolution is limited, however. For example, the absence of a true Community apparatus for foreign
policy rendered the political (not military) initiative in relation to the Iraqi crisis no more than hortatory.
See e.g., Gulf Crisis: Positions Taken By the Twelve and the Western European Union, EUROPE DOC. (No.
1644) 1 (Aug. 23, 1990) (statements of Aug. 2, 10, & 21, 1990); GulflEEC: The Foreign Ministers of the
Twelve Confirm Their Position and Intend to Draft an "Overall Concept" for their Relations with the
Region's Countries, EUROPE Doc. (No. 5413) 3-4 (Jan. 19, 1991). The Community has taken, however,
a leading role in the Yugoslav crisis
On the evolving foreign policy posture of the Community in the wake of 1992, see generally R.
DEHOUSE & J. WEILER, EPC AND THE SINGLE ACT: FROM SOFT LAW TO HARD LAW (European University
Institute Working Papers of the European Policy Unit, No. 90/1).
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eign policy posture for the Community would have been bitterly
contested by its very own Member States.4
(2) the mode of Community action. The European Commission now
plays a central role in dictating the Community agenda and in
shaping the content of its policy and norms. As recently as the late
1960's, the survival of supranationalism was a speculative matter,5
while in the 1970's, the Commission, self-critical and demoralized,
was perceived as an overblown and overpaid secretariat of the
Community.6
(3) the image and perception of the European Community. Changes in
these are usually more telling signs than the reality they represent.
In public discourse, "Europe" increasingly means the European
Community in much the same way that "America" means the
United States.
But these surface manifestations are just that-the seismographer's tell-tale
line reflecting deeper, below-the-surface movement in need of interpretation.
Arguably, the most significant change in Europe, justifying appellations such
as "transformation" and "metamorphosis," concerns the evolving relationship
between the Community and its Member States.
7
4. In 1973, the French Foreign Minister, M. Jobert, pressed the separateness [of the
Framework for European Political Cooperation which dealt with foreign policy] from
the Community to a point of forcing the Ministers to meet in EPC in Copenhagen in
the morning, and to assemble the same afternoon in Brussels as a Community Council
to deal with Community business.
Stein, Towards a European Foreign Policy? The European Foreign Affairs System from the Perspective
of the United States Constitution, in 1:3 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW 63 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Heathcote, The Crisis of European Supranationality, 5 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 140 (1966).
6. See, e.g., B. BIESHEUVEL, E. DELL & R. MARJOLiN, REPORT ON EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 10-12,
49-56 (1980) (report of the Committee of Three to the European Council, Oct. 1979) [hereinafter REPORT
ON EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS]; see also Proposal for Reform of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties and its Services (1979) (report made at the request of the Commission by an independent Review Body
under the Chairmanship of Mr. Dirk Spierenburg) (report requested in part because of sense of malaise in
Commission) [hereinafter Spierenburg Report]. For a self-mocking but penetrating picture, see M. VON
DONAT, EUROPE: QUI TIRE LES FICELLES? (1979).
7. The juxtaposition of Community/Member States is problematic. The concept of the Community,
analogous to the concept of the Trinity, is simultaneously both one and many. In some senses Community
is its individual Member States: in other senses it is distinct from them. This inevitable dilemma exists in
all federal arrangements. Moreover, the notion of an individual state itself is not monolithic. When one talks
of a Member State's interests, one usually sacrifices many nuances in understanding the specific position
of that state.
[Dlifferent, conflicting and often contradictory interests, either objective or subjective, are
frequently expressed as unified, subjective "national" interests. Behind these articulated, subjective
"national" interests, however, lie a variety of sets of social, economic and political relations, as
well as different relationships between private and public economic organisations and the state.
F. SNYDER, NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 90 (1990) (footnote omitted); see also id.
at 32, 37. While the danger of sacrificing these many voices within a state cannot be avoided, I shall try
to minimize it by referring to the interest of the Member States in preserving their prerogatives as such in
the Community polity.
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How can this transformation in the relationship between the Member States
and the Community be conceptualized?
In a recent case, the European Court of Justice spoke matter-of-factly of
the EEC Treaty8 as "the basic constitutional charter" of the Community.9 On
this reading, the Treaties have been "constitutionalized" and the Community
has become an entity whose closest structural model is no longer an internation-
al organization but a denser, yet nonunitary polity, principally the federal state.
Put differently, the Community's "operating system" is no longer governed by
general principles of public international law, but by a specified interstate
governmental structure defined by a constitutional charter and constitutional
principles.
This judicial characterization, endlessly repeated in the literature,10 under-
scores the fact that not simply the content of Community-Member State dis-
course has changed. The very architecture of the relationship, the group of
structural rules that define the mode of discourse, has mutated. Also, the
characterization gives us, as analytical tools, the main concepts developed in
evaluating nonunitary (principally federal) polities. We can compare the Com-
munity to known entities within meaningful paradigms.
This characterization might, however, lead to flawed analysis. It might be
read (and has been read") as suggesting that the cardinal material locus of
change has been the realm of law and that the principal actor has been the
European Court. But this would be deceptive. Legal and constitutional structural
change have been crucial, but only in their interaction with the Community
political process.
The characterization might also suggest a principal temporal locus of
change, a kind of "Big Bang" theory. It would almost be natural, and in any
event very tempting, to locate such a temporal point in that well-known series
of events that have shaken the Community since the mid-1980's and that are
encapsulated in that larger-than-life date, 1992.12 There is, after all, a plethora
8. EEC Treaty, as amended by the Single European Act (SEA).
9. Case 294/83, Parti ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365 [hereinaf-
ter Les Verts].
10. For fine recent analyses, see Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38
AM. J. Comp. L. 205 (1990); Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
595 (1989); and literature cited in both.
The importance of the legal paradigm as a characterizing feature of the Community is recognized also
in the nonlegal literature. See, e.g., Keohane & Hoffmann, Conclusions: Community Politics and Institutional
Change, in THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 276, 278-82 (W. Wallace ed. 1990).
11. "Tucked away in the fairyland Duchy of Luxembourg and blessed, until recently, with benign
neglect by the powers that be and the mass media, the Court of Justice of the European Communities has
fashioned a constitutional framework for a federal-type structure in Europe." Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and
the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1981); see also A. GREEN, POLITICAL
INTEGRATION BY JURISPIPUDENCE (1969).
12. 1992 actually encapsulates, in a game which resembles some new Cabala of Community life, a
temporal move to an ever increasing higher celestial sphere. The key dates in this game of numbers are:
the 1984 European Parliament Draft Treaty of European Union and the 1985 Commission White Paper
(completing the Internal Market), endorsed by the 1986 Single European Act (which entered into force in
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of literature which hails 1992 as the key seismic event in the Community
geology.13 But, one should resist that temptation too. This is not to deny the
importance of 1992 and the changes introduced in the late 1980's to the
structure and process of Community life and to the relationship between
Community and Member States. But even if 1992 is a seismic mutation,
explosive and visible, it is nonetheless in the nature of an eruption.
My claim is that the 1992 eruption was preceded by two deeper, and hence
far less visible, profound mutations of the very foundational strata of the
Community, each taking place in a rather distinct period in the Community's
evolution. The importance of these earlier subterranean mutations is both
empirical and cognitive. Empirically, the 1992 capsule was both shaped by, and
is significant because of, the earlier Community mutations. Cognitively, we
cannot understand the 1992 eruption and the potential of its shockwaves without
a prior understanding of the deeper mutations that conditioned it.
Thus, although I accept that the Community has been transformed profound-
ly, I believe this transformation occurred in three distinct phases. In each of
the phases a fundamental feature in the relationship of the Community to its
Member States mutated; only the combination of all three can be said to have
transformed the Community's "operating system" as a non-unitary polity.
These perceptions condition the methodological features of my Article. One
feature is a focus on evolution. I shall chart the principal characteristics of the
new "operating system" in an historical framework. In other words, I shall tell
a story of evolution over time. This approach will enable me not only to
describe but also to analyze and explain. Each evolving facet of the new system
will be presented as a "development" that needs systemic and historical analy-
sis.
Second, in this analysis I shall focus on what I consider to be the two key
structural dimensions of constitutionalism in a nonunitary polity: (a) the
relationships between political power in the center and the periphery and
between legal norms and policies of the center and the periphery; and (b) the
principle governing the division of material competences between Community
and Member States, usually alluded to as the doctrine of enumerated powers.
The structure and process of the Community will thus occupy pride of place
rather than substantive policy and content.
July 1987), and to which was added the April 1988 Commission (Delors) Plan of Economic and Monetary
Union, endorsed in the 1989 Madrid Summit and strengthened by the Dublin 1990 decision to hold two
Intergovernmental Conferences leading to a new treaty in 1991. The new treaty is to deal with Economic
and Monetary Union as well as Political Union and is to come into effect by the date of arrival at the highest
sphere of all, 1992.
13. "The Single European Act... represents the most comprehensive and most important amendment
to the EEC Treaty to date." Ehlermann, The "1992 Project": Stages, Structures, Results and Prospects,
11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1097, 1103 (1990) [hereinafter "1991 Project"]. Although I agree with Ehlermann
that the SEA is the most important formal amendment, I contend that earlier developments without formal
amendment should be considered even more important. For a recent comprehensive bibliography of 1992
literature, see I1 MICH. J. INT'L L. 571 (1990).
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The final feature of my methodological approach relates to the position of
law in the evolution of the Community. In a sharp critique of a classic study
of the European Community legal order, Martin Shapiro made the following
comments, which could be leveled against much of the legal literature on the
Community:
[The study] is a careful and systematic exposition of the judicial review
provisions of the "constitution" of the European Economic Community,
an exposition that is helpful for a newcomer to these materials. But-
... [i]t is constitutional law without politics .... [Ilt presents the
Community as a juristic idea; the written constitution as a sacred text;
the professional commentary as a legal truth; the case law as the inevita-
ble working out of the correct implications of the constitutional text;
and the constitutional court as the disembodied voice of right reason and
constitutional theology .... [S]uch an approach has proved fundamen-
tally arid in the study of [national] constitutions ... it must reduce
constitutional scholarship to something like that early stage of archeolo-
gy that resembled the collection of antiquities.., oblivious to their
context or living matrix. 4
The plea for a "Law and. . ." approach is of course de rigueur, be it Law
and Economics, Law and Culture, Law and Society-Law in Context. At one
level, a goal of this Article will be precisely to meet aspects of this critique of,
and challenge to, European legal literature. I shall try to analyze the Community
constitutional order with particular regard to its living political matrix; the
interactions between norms and norm-making, constitution and institutions,
principles and practice, and the Court of Justice and the political organs will
lie at the core of this Article.
And yet, even though I shall look at relationships of legal structure and
political process, at law and power, my approach is hardly one of Law in
Context-it is far more modest. In my story, de Gaulle and Thatcher, the
economic expansion of the 1960's, the oil crisis of the 1970's, Socialists and
Christian Democrats, and all like elements of the political history of the epoch
play pithy parts. It is perhaps ironic, but my synthesis and analysis are truly
in the tradition of the "pure theory of law" with the riders that "law" encom-
passes a discourse that is much wider than doctrine and norms and that the very
dichotomy of law and politics is questionable.
The shortcomings of this "purism" (not total to be sure) are self-evident:
my contribution cannot be but a part of a more totalistic and comprehensive
history. But, if successful, the "pure" approach has some virtues, as its ultimate
14. Shapiro, Comparative Law and Comparative Politics, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 537, 538 (1980). In his
comment Shapiro alludes to what in its own terms is a model analysis: Barav, The Judicial Power of the
European Economic Community 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1980). And, of course, not all constitutional
scholarship of the Community falls into this trap. See, e.g., F. SNYDER, supra note 7; Lenaerts, supra note
10; Mancini, supra note 10.
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claim is that much that has happened in the systemic evolution of Europe is
self-referential and results from the internal dynamics of the system itself,
almost as if it were insulated from those "external" aspects.15
I. 1958 TO THE MID-1970's: THE FOUNDATIONAL PERIOD--TOWARD A
THEORY OF EQUILIBRIUM
16
The importance of developments in this early period cannot be overstated.
They transcend anything that has happened since. It is in this period that the
Community assumed, in stark change from the original conception of the
Treaty, its basic legal and political characteristics. But understanding the
dynamics of the Foundational Period is of more than historical interest; the
patterns of Community-Member State interaction that crystalized in this period
conditioned all subsequent developments in Europe.
In order to explain the essentials of the Foundational Period, I would like
to make recourse to an apparent paradox, the solution to which will be my
device for describing and analyzing the European Community system.
A. A Paradox and its Solution: Exit and Voice
If we were to ask a lawyer during the Foundational Period to compare the
evolution of the European Community with the American experience, the
lawyer would have said that the Community was becoming "more and more
like a federal (or at least pre-federal) state." By contrast, if we were to ask a
political scientist at the same point in time to compare the European system
with, say, the American system, the political scientist would have given a
diametrically opposite answer: "they are growing less and less alike."
The paradox can be phrased in noncomparative terms: from a legal-norma-
tive point of view, the Community developed in that first phase with an inexo-
rable dynamism of enhanced supranationalism. European legal integration
moved powerfully ahead. From a political-decisional-procedural tionalismpoint
of view, the very same period was characterized by a counter-development
towards intergovernmentalism and away from European integration. It is not
15. The "insulation" cannot be total. External events are mediated through the prism of the system and
do not have a reality of their own. Cf. Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AuTOPoIETc LAW:
A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (G. Teubner ed. 1988) (the autopoietic approach to law, pioneered
by Niklas Luhmann and elaborated by Gunther Teubner, acknowledges a much greater role to internal
discourse of law in explaining its evolutionary dynamics: autopoiesis also gives a more careful explanation
to the impact of external reality on legal system, a reality which will always be mediated by its legal
perception).
16. The intellectual genesis of this Article is rooted in my earlier work on the Community. See Weiler,
The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267 (1981). It was later
developed in J. WEILER, IL SISTEMA COMUNITARIO EUROPEO (1985) (an attempt to construct a general
theory explaining the supranational features of the European Community). In the present work I have tried,
first, to locate my construct, revised in the light of time, within a broader context of systemic understanding
and, second, to use it as a tool to illuminate the more recent phenomenon of 1992.
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surprising, therefore, that lawyers were characterizing the Community of that
epoch as a "constitutional framework for a federal-type structure,"17 whereas
political scientists were speculating about the "survival of supranationalism."'I
Identifying the factual and conceptual contours of this paradox of the
Community and explaining the reasons for it will be the key to explaining the
significance of the Foundational Period in the evolution of the Community.
What then are the contours of this legal-political puzzle? How can it be
explained? What is its significance?
In Exit, Voice and Loyalty, 9 Hirschman identified the categories of Exit
and Voice with the respective disciplines of economics and politics. Exit corre-
sponded to the simplified world of the economist, whereas Voice corresponded
to the messy (and supposedly more complex) world of the political scientist.
Hirschman stated:
Exit and Voice, that is, market and non-market forces, that is, economic
and political mechanisms, have been introduced as two principal actors
of strictly equal rank and importance. In developing my play on that
basis I hope to demonstrate to political scientists the usefulness of
economic concepts and to economists the usefulness of political con-
cepts. This reciprocity has been lacking in recent interdisciplinary
work .... 20
The same can be said about the interplay between legal and political analysis.
The interdisciplinary gap there is just as wide.
The interplay of Exit and Voice is fairly clear and needs only a brief
adjustment for the Community circumstance. Exit is the mechanism of organi-
zational abandonment in the face of unsatisfactory performance. Voice is the
mechanism of intraorganizational correction and recuperation. Apart from
identifying these two basic types of reaction to malperformance, Hirschman's
basic insight is to identify a kind of zero-sum game between the two. Crudely
put, a stronger "outlet" for Voice reduces pressure on the Exit option and can
lead to more sophisticated processes of self-correction. By contrast, the closure
of Exit leads to demands for enhanced Voice. And although Hirschman devel-
oped his concepts to deal with the behavior of the marketplace, he explicitly
suggested that the notions of Exit and Voice may be applicable to membership
behavior in any organizational setting.
Naturally I shall have to give specific characterizations to Exit and Voice
in the Community context. I propose first to discuss in legal categories the Exit
17. Stein, supra note 4, at 1.
18. Heathcote, supra note 5.
19. A. HIRSCHMAN, EXrr, VOICE AND LOYALTY-RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS
AND STATES (1970).
20. Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
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option in the European Community. I shall then introduce Voice in political
categories.
B. Exit in the European Community: Formal and Selective
Formal (or total) Exit is of course an easy notion, signifying the withdrawal
of a Member State from the European Community. Lawyers have written reams
about the legality of unilateral Member State withdrawal." The juridical
conclusion is that unilateral withdrawal is illegal. Exit is foreclosed. But this
is precisely the type of legal analysis that gives lawyers a bad name in other
disciplines. It takes no particular insight to suggest that should a Member State
consider withdrawing from the Community, the legal argument will not be the
critical or determining consideration. If Total Exit is foreclosed, it is because
of the high enmeshment of the Member States and the potential, real or per-
ceived, for political and economic losses to the withdrawing state.
Whereas the notion of Total Exit is thus not particularly helpful, or at least
it does not profit from legal analysis, I would introduce a different notion, that
of Selective Exit: the practice of the Member States of retaining membership
but seeking to avoid their obligations under the Treaty, be it by omission or
commission. In the life of many international organizations, including the
Community, Selective Exit is a much more common temptation than Total Exit.
A principal feature of the Foundational Period has been the closure, albeit
incomplete, of Selective Exit with obvious consequences for the decisional
behavior of the Member States.
C. The Closure of Selective Exit
The "closure of selective Exit" signifies the process curtailing the ability
of the Member States to practice a selective application of the acquis commu-
nautaire, the erection of restraints on their ability to violate or disregard their
binding obligations under the Treaties and the laws adopted by Community
institutions.
In order to explain this process of "closure" I must recapitulate two dimen-
sions of E.C. development: (1) the "constitutionalization" of the Community
legal structure; and (2) the system of legal/judicial guarantees.
21. For further discussion, see Weiler, Alternatives to Withdrawal from an International Organization:
The Case of the European Economic Community, 20 ISRAEL L. REv. 282, 284-88 (1985).
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1. The Foundational Period: The "Constitutionalization" of the Communi-
ty Legal Structure
Starting in 1963 and continuing into the early 1970's and beyond,' the
European Court of Justice in a series of landmark decisions established four
doctrines that fixed the relationship between Community law and Member State
law and rendered that relationship indistinguishable from analogous legal
relationships in constitutional federal states.
a. The Doctrine of Direct Effect
The judicial doctrine of direct effect, introduced in 1963 and developed
subsequently,' provides the following presumption: Community legal norms
that are clear, precise, and self-sufficient (not requiring further legislative
measures by the authorities of the Community or the Member States) must be
regarded as the law of the land in the sphere of application of Community law.
Direct effect (a rule of construction in result) applies to all actions producing
legal effects in the Community: the Treaty itself and secondary legislation.
Moreover, with the exception of one type of Community legislation,24 direct
effect operates not only in creating enforceable legal obligations between the
Member States and individuals, but also among individuals inter se. Critically,
being part of the law of the land means that Community norms may be invoked
by individuals before their state courts, which must provide adequate legal
remedies for the E.C. norms just as if they were enacted by the state legislature.
The implications of this doctrine were and are far reaching. The European
Court reversed the normal presumption of public international law whereby
international legal obligations are result-oriented and addressed to states. Public
international law typically allows the internal constitutional order of a state to
determine the method and extent to which international obligations may, if at
all, produce effects for individuals within the legal order of the state. Under
the normal canons of international law, even when the international obligation
itself, such as a trade agreement or a human rights convention, is intended to
bestow rights (or duties) on individuals within a state, if the state fails to
bestow the rights, the individual cannot invoke the international obligation
before national courts, unless internal constitutional or statutory law, to which
22. The process of constitutionalization is an ongoing one. I suggest the 1970's as a point of closure
since, as shall be seen, by the early 1970's all major constitutional doctrines were already in place. What
followed were refinements.
23. On the doctrine of direct effect and its evolution, see T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPE-
AN COMMUNITY LAW 183-218 (1988).
24. Community directives may produce direct effects in the vertical relationship between public
authority and individuals but not in the horizontal relationship of individuals inter se. See Case 148178,
Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629; Case 152/84, M.H. Marshall v. Southampton and
South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, 1986 E.C.R. 723.
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public international law is indifferent, provides for such a remedy. The typical
remedy under public international law in such a case would be an inter-state
claim. The main import of the Community doctrine of direct effect was not
simply the conceptual change it ushered forth. In practice direct effect meant
that Member States violating their Community obligations could not shift the
locus of dispute to the interstate or Community plane. They would be faced
with legal actions before their own courts at the suit of individuals within their
own legal order.
Individuals (and their lawyers) noticed this practical implication, and the
number of cases brought on the basis of this doctrine grew exponentially.
Effectively, individuals in real cases and controversies (usually against state
public authorities) became the principal "guardians" of the legal integrity of
Community law within Europe similar to the way that individuals in the United
States have been the principal actors in ensuring the vindication of the Bill of
Rights and other federal law.
b. The Doctrine of Supremacy
The doctrine of direct effect might not strike all observers as that revolu-
tionary, especially those observers coming from a monist constitutional order
in which international treaties upon ratification are transposed automatically into
the municipal legal order and in which some provisions of international treaties
may be recognized as "self-executing." The full impact of direct effect is
realized in combination with the second "constitutionalizing" doctrine, suprema-
cy. Unlike some federal constitutions, the Treaty does not include a specific
"supremacy clause." However, in a series of cases starting in 196425 the Court
has pronounced an uncompromising version of supremacy: in the sphere of
application of Community law, any Community norm, be it an article of the
Treaty (the Constitutional Charter) or a minuscule administrative regulation
enacted by the Commission, "trumps" conflicting national law whether enacted
before or after the Community norm. Additionally, although this has never been
stated explicitly, the Court has the "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" in the Community
legal order, i.e. it is the body that determines which norms come within the
sphere of application of Community law.
26
25. For a particularly subtle analysis of the supremacy of Community law and its evolution, see J.
USHER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW-THE IRREVERSIBLE TRANSFER 30-38 (1981).
For a more skeptical view, see De Witte, Retour a "Costa". La primautj dt droit communautaire d la
htmire dit droit international, 20 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DU DROIT EUROPEENNE, [RTDEURI 425 (1984).
For a survey and analysis of the most recent constitutional developments, see Jacobs, ConstitutionalDevelop-
ments in the European Community and the Impact of the Single European Market After 1992, 11 MIcH.
J. INT'L L. 887 (1990). Recently the final resistance to Supremacy was removed with the decision of the
French Conseil d'Etat in Raoul Georges Nicolo and Others [ 19901 CMLR 173.
26. The principle of supremacy can be expressed, not as an absolute rule whereby Community (or
federal) law trumps Member State law, but instead as a principle whereby each law is supreme within its
sphere of competence. This more accurate characterization of supremacy renders crucial the question of
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In light of supremacy the full significance of direct effect becomes transpar-
ent. Typically, in monist or quasi-monist states like the United States, although
treaty provisions, including self-executing ones, may be received automatically
into the municipal legal order, their normative status is equivalent to national
legislation. Thus the normal rule of "later in time" (lex posteriori derogat lex
anteriori) governs the relationship between the treaty provision and conflicting
national legislation. A national legislature unhappy with an internalized treaty
norm simply enacts a conflicting national measure and the transposition will
have vanished for all internal practical effects.27 By contrast, in the Communi-
ty, because of the doctrine of supremacy, the E.C. norm, which by virtue of
the doctrine of direct effect must be regarded as part of the Law of the Land,
will prevail even in these circumstances. The combination of the two doctrines
means that Community norms that produce direct effects are not merely the
Law of the Land but the "Higher Law" of the Land. Parallels to this kind of
constitutional architecture may, with very few exceptions, be found only in the
internal constitutional order of federal states.
c. The Doctrine of Implied Powers
One possible rationale underlying the Court's jurisprudence in both direct
effect and supremacy has been its attempt to maximize the efficiency by which
the Community performs the tasks entrusted to it by the Treaty. As part of this
rationale, one must consider the question of specific powers granted the Com-
munity to perform these tasks. Direct effect and supremacy will not serve their
functions if the Community does not have the necessary instruments at its
defining the spheres of competence and in particular the concomitantinstitutional question which court will
have the final decision as to the definition of spheres, i.e. the question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The
European Court has never addressed this issue squarely, but implicit in the case law is the clear understand-
ing that the Court has, as a matter of Community law, the ultimate say on the reach of Community law.
See, e.g., Case 66/80, Spa Int'I Chemical Corp. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Strato, 1981 E.C.R.
1191; Case 314/85, Firma Foto Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lubeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, cases in which the
Court reserved to itself the prerogative of declaring Community law invalid.
In principle, under the EEC Treaty, art. 173, there are several reasons for annulling a measure of
Community law-for example, infringement of an essential procedural requirement under EEC law. This
issue, clearly, seems to belong in the exclusive province of the European Court of Justice. On second look
however, one of the grounds for annulment, indeed the first mentioned in Article 173, is "lack of compe-
tence." If the issue of competence relates only to the respective competence of the various Community
institutions, there is no problem in regarding this issue too as falling exclusively in the hands of the
European Court of Justice. But the phrase "lack of competence" clearly applies also to the question of
general competence of the Community vis-a-vis its Member States. The question as to what part of
legislative competence was granted the Community by the Member States is, arguably, as much an issue
of Member State constitutional law as it is of Community law. By claiming in the aforementioned cases
exclusive jurisdiction to pronounce on these issues the Court was implicitly, but unquestionably, asserting
its Kompetenz-Kompetenz, its exclusive competence to determine the competence of the Community. Of
course one rationale of the decision is to ensure the uniform application of Community law throughout its
legal space. But this rationale, functionally persuasive as it may be, does not necessarily override from the
perspective of a Member State the interest in the integrity of a state's constitutional order.
27. Of course, on the international plane, a wrong, for which state responsibility would lie, would have
been committed. The remedies for this wrong would be on the international plane as well.
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disposal. The issue in which this consideration came to the fore, in 1970, was
the treaty-making power of the Community. The full realization of many E.C.
internal policies clearly depended on the ability of the Community to negotiate
and conclude international treaties with third parties. As is the case with
Member States, the problems facing the Community do not respect its internal
territorial and jurisdictional boundaries. The Treaty itself was rather sparing in
granting the Community treaty-making power, limiting it to a few specified
cases.
In its landmark decision of that periods (the period circa 1971) the Euro-
pean Court held that the grant of internal competence must be read as implying
an external treaty-making power. The European Court added that Community
international agreements would be binding not only on the Community as such,
but also, as appropriate, on and within the Member States.29 The significance
of this ruling goes beyond the issue of treaty-making power. With this decision,
subsequently replicated in different contexts," the European Court added
another rung in its constitutional ladder: powers would be implied in favor of
the Community where they were necessary to serve legitimate ends pursued
by it. Beyond its enormous practical ramifications, the critical point was the
willingness of the Court to sidestep the presumptive rule of interpretation
typical in international law, that treaties must be interpreted in a manner that
minimizes encroachment on state sovereignty. The Court favored a teleological,
purposive rule drawn from the book of constitutional interpretation.
In a parallel, although much less noticed, development, the European Court
began to develop its jurisprudence on the relationship between areas of Commu-
nity and Member State competence. The Treaty itself is silent on this issue. It
may have been presumed that all authority granted to the Community was to
be shared concurrently with the Member States, subject only to the emerging
principle of supremacy. Member States could adopt national policies and laws,
provided these did not contradict Community law in the same sphere.
In a bifurcated line of jurisprudence laid in place in the early 1970's and
continued thereafter, the European Court developed two complementary doc-
trines: exclusivity and preemption.3" In a number of fields, most importantly
in common commercial policy, the European Court held that the powers of the
28. Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities,
1971 E.C.R. 263 [hereinafter ERTA].
29. For the evolution of the foreign relations power of the Community, see J. GROUX & P. MANIN,
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1985); Lachman, International Legal
Personality of the EC: Capacity and Competence. 1984 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 3: Veiler The
External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle, in MIXED AGREEMENTS
35 (1983).
30. The doctrine of implied powers is discussed fully in Tizzano, Les Compctences de la Communautl ,
in TRENTE ANS DE DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE 45, 49-52 (European Commission, Perspectives Europennes,
1982).
31. See Waelbroeck, The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption--Consent and Re.delegation,
in 2 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 548 (1982).
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Community were exclusive. Member States were precluded from taking any
action per se, whether or not their action conflicted with a positive measure of
Community law. In other fields the exclusivity was not an a priori notion.
Instead, only positive Community legislation in these fields triggered a preemp-
tive effect, barring Member States from any action, whether or not in actual
conflict with Community law, according to specific criteria developed by the
Court.
Exclusivity and preemption not only constitute an additional constitutional
layer on those already mentioned but also have had a profound effect on
Community decisionmaking. Where a field has been preempted or is exclusive
and action is needed, the Member States are pushed to act jointly.
d. The Doctrine of Human Rights
The last major constitutional tremor was in the field of human rights.32
The Treaty contains no Bill of Rights and there is no explicit provision for
judicial review of an alleged violation of human rights. In a much discussed
line of cases starting in 1969, the Court asserted that it would, nonetheless,
review Community measures for any violation of fundamental human rights,
adopting for its criteria the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States and the international human rights conventions to which the Member
States subscribed. This enormously complex jurisprudence will be discussed
later in this Article, but its symbolic significance in a "constitution-building"
exercise deserves mention here. The principal message was that the arrogation
of power to the Community implicit in the other three doctrines would not be
left unchecked. Community norms, at times derived only from an implied grant
of power, often directly effective, and always supreme, would be subjected to
a human rights scrutiny by the Court. This scrutiny is important given the
"Democracy Deficit" in Community decisionmaking.
If nothing else, this jurisprudence was as clear an indication as any of the
audacious self-perception of the European Court. The measure of creative
interpretation of the Treaty was so great as to be consonant with a self-image
of a constitutional court in a "constitutional" polity. It should be noted further
that the human rights jurisprudence had, paradoxically, the hallmarks of the
deepest jurists' prudence. The success of the European Court's bold moves with
regard to the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, implied powers, and human
rights ultimately would depend on their reception by the highest constitutional
courts in the different Member States.
The most delicate issue in this context was that of supremacy. National
courts were likely to accept direct effect and implied-powers, but found it
32. See Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some questions concerning the role of the European Court
of Justice in the protection of fundamental human rights within the legal order of the European Communi-
ties, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (1986).
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difficult to swallow the notion that Community law must prevail even in the
face of an explicit later-in-time provision of a national legislature to whom,
psychologically, if not in fact constitutionally, Member State courts owed
allegiance. Accepting supremacy of Community law without some guarantee
that this supreme law would not violate rights fundamental to the legal patrimo-
ny of an individual Member State would be virtually impossible. This especially
would be true in Member States like Italy and Germany where human rights
enjoy constitutional protection. Thus, even if protection of human rights per
se need not be indispensable to fashioning a federal-type constitution, it was
critical to the acceptance by courts in the Member States of the other elements
of constitution-building. One by one, the highest jurisdictions in the Member
States accepted the new judicial architecture of Europe.33
The skeptic may, however, be justified in challenging the "new legal order"
I have described incorporating these doctrines,34 especially the sharp lines it
tries to draw in differentiating the "new" Community order from the "old"
public international law order. After all, a cardinal principle of international law
is its supremacy over national law. The notion of direct effect, or at least self-
execution, is also known to international law, and implied powers jurisprudence
has operated in the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice as
well.35 If international law shares these notions of supremacy, direct effect,
and implied powers,3 6 the skeptic may be correct in challenging the character-
ization of Community development in the Foundational Period as something
out of the ordinary.
One reply is that the Community phenomenon represents a quantitative
change of such a magnitude that it is qualitative in nature. Direct effect may
exist in international law but it is operationalized in so few instances that it
must be regarded as the exception which proves the general rule of its virtual
nonexistence. In the Community order direct effect is presumptive.37 The
question of supremacy, however, brings the key difference between the two
systems into sharp relief. International law is as uncompromising as Community
law in asserting that its norms are supreme over conflicting national norms. But,
international law's horizontal system of enforcement, which is typically actuated
through the principles of state responsibility, reciprocity, and counter measures,
33. The story of acceptance of the principle of supremacy by national courts is charted in H.
SCHERMERS & D. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNMES 115-24 (1987).
See also M. VAN EMPEL, LEADING CASES ON THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMurlmS 203-39 (1990).
34. See, e.g., Wyatt, New Legal Order; or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147 (1982); see also, De Witte, supra
note 25.
35. See, e.g., Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.L 174.
36. One could also argue that protection of fundamental human rights has become part of the customary
law patrimony of international law. Cf., Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (deliberate
torture under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of international law of human
rights).
37. See Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An ifant Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR. L.
REV. 155 (1983).
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gives the notion of supremacy an exceptionally rarified quality, making it
difficult to grasp and radically different from that found in the constitutional
orders of states with centralized enforcement monopolies.
The constitutionalization claim regarding the Treaties establishing the
European Community can only be sustained by adding one more layer of
analysis: the system of judicial remedies and enforcement. It is this system, as
interpreted and operationalized by the European judicial branch, that truly
differentiates the Community legal order from the horizontality of classical
public international law.
2. The Community System of Judicial Review
As mentioned above, the hierarchy of norms within the European Communi-
ty is typical of a nonunitary system. The Higher Law of the Community is, of
course, the Treaty itself. Neither Community organs nor the Member States may
violate the Treaty in their legislative and administrative actions. In addition,
Member States may not violate Community regulations, directives, and deci-
sions. Not surprisingly, then, the Community features a double-limbed system
of judicial review, operating on two levels. Two sets of legislative acts and
administrative measures are subject to judicial review: (1) the measures of the
Community itself (principally acts of the Council of Ministers, Commission,
and European Parliament), which are reviewable for conformity with the
Treaties; and (2) the acts of the Member States, which are reviewable for their
conformity with Community law and policy, including the above-mentioned
secondary legislation.
Needless to say, in the context of my discussion of the closure of Exit and
of Member States' attempts to disregard those obligations they dislike, the
effectiveness of review of the second set of measures assumes critical impor-
tance. I, therefore, focus only on that aspect of judicial review here.
a. Judicial Review at the Community Level
Either the Commission or an individual Member State may, in accordance
with Articles 169-72 of the EEC Treaty, bring an action against a Member State
for failure to fulfill its obligations under the Treaty. Generally, this failure takes
the form either of inaction in implementing a Community obligation or enact-
ment of a national measure contrary to Community obligations. The existence
of a mandatory and exclusive forum for adjudication of these types of disputes
sets the Community apart from many international organizations.
The role of the Commission is even more special. As one commentator
noted, "[u]nder traditional international law the enforcement of treaty obliga-
tions is a matter to be settled amongst the Contracting Parties themselves.
Article 169, in contrast, enables an independent Community body, the Commis-
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sion, to invoke the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court against a
defaulting Member State.
' 38
At the same time, the "intergovernmental" character of this procedure and
the consequent limitations on its efficacy are clear. Four weaknesses are particu-
larly glaring:
(1) the procedure is political in nature; the Commission (appropriately)
may have nonlegal reasons not to initiate a prosecution;
(2) a centralized agency with limited human resources is unable ade-
quately to identify, process, and monitor all possible Member State
violations and infringements;
(3) Article 169 may be inappropriate to apply to small violations; even
if small violations are properly identified, dedicating Commission
resources to infringements that do not raise an important principle or
create a major economic impact is wasteful; and finally, and most
importantly,
(4) no real enforcement exists; proceedings conclude with a "declara-
tory" judgment of the European Court without enforcement sanctions.
b. Judicial Review at the Member State Level
The weaknesses of Articles 169-172 are remedied to an extent by judicial
review within the judicial systems of the Member States in collaboration with
the European Court of Justice. Article 177 provides, inter alia, that when a
question concerning the interpretation of the Treaty is raised before a national
court, the court may suspend the national proceedings and request a preliminary
ruling from the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg on the correct
interpretation of the Treaty. If the national court is the court of last resort, then
it must request a European Court ruling. Once this ruling is made, it is remitted
back to the national court which gives, on the basis of the ruling, the opinion
in the case before it. The national courts and the European Court are thus
integrated into a unitary system of judicial review.
The European Court and national courts have made good use of this proce-
dure. On its face the purpose of Article 177 is simply to ensure uniform
interpretation of Community law throughout the Member States. That, apparent-
ly, is how the framers of the Treaty understood it.39 However, very often the
38. Evans, The Enforcement Procedure of Article 169 EEC: Commission Discretion, 4 EUR. L. REV.
442, 443 (1979).
39. Pescatore, Les Travaux d "Groupe Juridique" dans la Nigociation des Traits de Rome, 34
STUDIA DIPLOMATICA 159, 173 (1981) ("Pour autant que je m'en souvienne, l'acceptation de cette ide,
dans son principe, ne fit pas de difficult~s; je penche "t croire que tous, peut-6tre, n'avaint pas conscience
de l'importance de cette innovation.").
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factual situation in which Article 177 comes into play involves an individual
litigant pleading in national court that a rule, measure, or national practice
should not be applied because it violates the Community obligations of the
Member State. In this manner the attempts of Member States to practice
selective Community membership by disregarding their obligations have
become regularly adjudicated before their own national courts. On submission
of the case, the European Court has rendered its interpretation of Community
law within the factual context of the case before it. Theoretically, the European
Court may not itself rule on the application of Community law. But, as one
scholar notes:
[I]t is no secret... that in practice, when making preliminary rulings
the Court has often transgressed the theoretical border line .... [-]t
provides the national judge with an answer in which questions of law
and of fact are sufficiently interwoven as to leave the national judge
with only little discretion and flexibility in making his final decision.'
The fact that the national court renders the final judgment is crucial to the
procedure. The binding effect and enforcement value of such a decision, coming
from a Member State's own court, may be contrasted with a similar decision
handed down in declaratory fashion by the European Court under the previously
discussed Article 169 procedure. A national court opinion takes care of the most
dramatic weakness of the Article 169 procedure: the ability of a Member State,
in extremis, to disregard the strictures of the European Court. Under the 177
procedure this disregard is impossible. A state, in our Western democracies,
cannot disobey its own courts.
The other weaknesses of the 169 procedure are also remedied to some
extent: individual litigants are usually not politically motivated in bringing their
actions; small as well as big violations are adjudicated; and, in terms of moni-
toring, the Community citizen becomes, willy-nilly, a decentralized agent for
monitoring compliance by Member States with their Treaty obligations.
The Article 177 system is not complete, however. Not all violations come
before national courts; the success of the system depends on the collaboration
between national courts and the European Court of Justice; and Member States
may, and often have, utilized the delays of the system to defer ruling.
On the other hand, the overall effect of the judicial remedies cannot be
denied. The combination of the "constitutionalization" and the system of
judicial remedies to a large extent nationalized Community obligations and
introduced on the Community level the habit of obedience and the respect for
40. Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private Plaintiffs?, 5 EuR. L. REV. 112, 125
(1980).
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the rule of law which traditionally is less associated with international obliga-
tions than national ones.
41
It is at this juncture that one may speculate about the most profound
difference between the Community legal order and international law generally.
The combined effect of constitutionalization and the evolution of the system
of remedies results, in my view, in the removal from the Community legal
order of the most central legal artifact of international law: the notion (and
doctrinal apparatus) of exclusive state responsibility with its concomitant
principles of reciprocity and countermeasures. The Community legal order, on
this view, is a truly self-contained legal regime with no recourse to the mecha-
nism of state responsibility, at least as traditionally understood, and therefore
to reciprocity and countermeasures, even in the face of actual or potential
failure.42 Without these features, so central to the classic international legal
order, the Community truly becomes something "new."
At the end of the day the debate about the theoretical difference between
international law and Community law may have the relevance of some long-
lasting theological disputes-i.e. none at all. Whatever the differences in theory,
there can be no argument that the Community legal order as it emerged from
the Foundational Period appeared in its operation much closer to a working
constitutional order, a fact which, as will shortly emerge, had a fundamental
impact on the way in which it was treated by its Member States.
41. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (especially chs. 3 & 10); see also Jones, The Legal
Nature of the European Community: A Jurisprudential Analysis Using H.L.A. Hart's Model of Law and
a Legal System, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1984).
42. The argument for treating the Community as a fully self-contained regime in which states cannot
resort to countermeasures rests, briefly, on two lines of reasoning. First, the Treaty itself provides for a
comprehensive system of compulsory judicial dispute resolution and remedies, akin to that in a federal state,
which would exclude the apparatus of state responsibility and countermeasures, a creature of the self-help
horizontality of international law. Cf. Submissions of the Commission cited approvingly by the Court in
Joined Cases 142 & 143/80, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dellostato v. Essevi, 1981 E.C.R. 1413, 1431
("la]bove all, it must be pointed out that in no circumstances may the Member States rely on similar
infringements by other Member States in order to escape their own obligations under the provisions of the
Treaty"); Joined Cases 90 & 91/63, EEC Commission v. Luxembourg, 1964 E.C.R. 625; Case 232/78, EEC
Commission v. France 1979 E.C.R. 2729. See also Ministere Public v. Guy Blanguernon [ 1990] 2 CMLR
340 ("[A]ccording to settled case law, a Member state cannot justify failure to fulfill its obligation ... by
the fact that other Member States have also failed to fulfill theirs.... Under the legal system laid down
by the Treaty the implementation of Community law by Member States cannot be subject to a condition
of reciprocity.") (p. 6).
Second, even in an extreme case in which a Member State failed to execute ajudgment of the European
Court, the recourse to countermeasures would inevitably affect individuals removed from the dispute,
militating against the very notion of a "new legal order of international law ... the subjects of which
comprise not the only Member States but also their nationals." Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en
Expeditie Oderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. Recital
2 [hereinafter Van Gend & Loos]. Contra Simma, Self Contained Regimes, 16 NETHERLANDs Y.B. INT'L
L. 111, 123-29 (1985) (sustains ultimate recourse, even for Community, to public law and classical state
reponsibility).
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D. The Dynamics of Voice in the Foundational Period
I return to the main theme of this part of the analysis: the relationship
between Voice and Exit.
The closure of Exit, in my perspective, means that Community obligations,
Community law, and Community policies were "for real." Once adopted (the
crucial phrase is "once adopted"), Member States found it difficult to avoid
Community obligations. If Exit is foreclosed, the need for Voice increases. This
is precisely what happened in the European Community in the Foundational
Period. In what may almost be termed a ruthless process, Member States took
control over Community decisionmaking.
We may divide the Community decisionmaking process into the following
phases: (1) the political impetus for a policy; (2) the technical elaboration of
policies and norms; (3) the formulation of a formal proposal; (4) the adoption
of the proposal; and (5) the execution of the adopted proposal.
The Treaty's original decisionmaking process had strong supranational
elements. The European Commission, the Community body par excellence, had
virtually exclusive proposal-making competence (the nearly exclusive "right
of initiative"), essentially enabling it to determine the agenda of the Communi-
ty. The Commission was also responsible for preparing the proposals for formal
adoption by the Council of Ministers (comprising the representatives of the
Member States) and for acting as the secondary legislature of the Community.
The adoption process was supranational, especially in relation to most opera-
tional areas, in that it foresaw, by the end of the transitional period, decision
by majority voting. Finally, execution (by administrative regulation) was, again,
the preserve of the Commission.
During the Foundational Period, in every phase of decisionmaking, the
Member States, often at the expense of the Commission, assumed a dominant
say. The cataclysmic event was the 1965 crisis brought about by France, which
objected to the entry into force of the Treaty provisions that would actually
introduce majority voting at the end of the Transitional Period. The crisis was
"resolved" by the legally dubious Luxembourg Accord,43 whereby, de facto,
each and every Member State could veto Community proposed legislation. This
signaled the rapid collapse of all other supranational features of Community
decisionmaking.
The European Council of Ministers, an organ dehors the Treaties, assumed
the role of giving impetus to the policy agenda of the Community. The Com-
mission formally retained its exclusive power of proposal, but in reality was
reduced to something akin to a secretariat. Technical elaboration became
43. The text may be found in B:2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW T B10-336.
Although the Accord does not as such sanction the veto power, "a convention giving each Member State,
in effect, a right of veto in respect of its 'very important interests' was established by the practice of the
Council after 1965." Id. at B10-337.
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infused with Member State influence in the shape of various groups of national
experts.4" In the proposal formulation process the Commission commenced a
practice of conducting a first, unofficial round of negotiations with COREPER,
the sub-organ of Council.45 In addition, as mentioned, the Luxembourg Accord
debilitated the Council's voting process, giving each Member State control over
proposals and their adoption. Even in the execution of policies, the Commission
and Community were "burdened" with a vast range of management and other
regulatory committees composed of Member State representatives who con-
trolled that process as well.46
Increased Voice is thus a code for a phenomenon of the Member States
jointly and severally taking control of decisionmaking, leading to the process
by which the original institutional structures foreseen in the Treaties broke
down. It caused the so-called Lourdeur47 of the Community process and is
believed by many to be the source of much of the Community malaise of that
period and beyond.
E. The Relationship between Exit and Voice in the Foundational Period
How then do we explain these conflicting developments on the legal and
political planes? I suggest explanations at three overlapping levels. The combi-
nation captures the richness and significance of the Community experience in
the Foundational Period.
First, the developments in each of the respective political and legal domains
can be explained as entirely self-referential and self-contained. Thus, for
example, the very advent of de Gaulle had a major negative impact in the
political realm.4 8 Within the realm of law there was a clear internal legal logic
which led the Court from, for example, the doctrine of direct effect to the
doctrine of supremacy. 9
44. See, e.g., REPORT ON EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, supra note 6; A. SPINELLI, TOWARDS THE
EUROPEAN UNION (1983).
45. COREPER, the Committee of Permananent Representatives, is composed of permanent representa-
tives of the Member States to the Community who fulfill the essential day-to-day role of State representa-
tives to Council. On the role of COREPER within the work of the Council of Ministers, see, e.g., REPORT
ON EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, supra note 6, at 39-41.
46. In passing, I should note that Member State control meant governmental-executive control. One
net effect of this process was the creation of the so-called democracy deficit, which I discuss infra. See infra
text following note 61.
47. The heaviness of the decisional process, debilitating to the efficiency of the Council and the
Community as a whole. See, e.g., REPORT ON EUROPEAN INSTITIONS, supra note 6, at 27-29, 37-38.
48. "Throughout the eleven years during which General de Gaulle [who was 'allergic' to anything
supranational] remained in power, no notable progress could be made in integration, either in the political
domain, the institutional domain, the monetary domain or in the geographical extension of the common
market." Greilsammer, supra note 1, at 141.
49. If one accepts, as one must, the principle of the uniform application of Community law throughout
the Community, a clear link exists whereby a holding of direct effect compels a holding of supremacy. In
Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. Recital 2, the Commission and the Advocate General differed as to whether
direct effect existed. The Advocate General argued that since the Community had no principle of supremacy,
there was no direct effect. The Commission argued that direct effect would compel supremacy. Thus,
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The second explanation is that in the face of a political crisis already
manifest in the 1960's, resulting from, inter alia, a new posture of France under
de Gaulle and declining political will among the Member States to follow the
decisionmaking processes of the Treaty and to develop a loyalty to the Europe-
an venture, the European Court of Justice stepped in to hold the construct
together.50 In this second level of analysis the relationship is unidirectional.
The integrating federal legal development was a response and reaction to a
disintegrating confederal political development.
The most fascinating question in this regard is how to explain the respon-
siveness of the Member State courts to the new judicial architecture. We have
already noted that absent such responsiveness-normatively in accepting the
new constitutional doctrines and practically in putting them into use through
the application of the preliminary reference procedure of Article 177-the
constitutional transformation ushered by the European Court would have re-
mained with all the systemic deficiencies of general public international law.
One could hardly have talked with credibility about a new legal order.
Due to its nature, reply to the question must remain speculative. In addition,
probably no one answer alone can explain this remarkable phenomenon. The
following are some possible explanations in brief, all of which may have
contributed to the overall enlistment of the judicial branch in Europe.
The first reply, one which holds considerable force, is the most obvious.
Courts are charged with upholding the law. The constitutional interpretations
given to the Treaty of Rome by the European Court of Justice carried legitima-
cy derived from two sources: first from the composition of the Court, which
had as members senior jurists from all Member States, and second from the
legal reasoning of the judgments themselves. One could cavil with this or that
decision,5 but the overall construct had an undeniable coherence, which
seemed truly to reflect the purposes of the Treaty to which the Member States
had solemnly adhered.
Secondly, it is clear that a measure of transnational incrementalism devel-
oped. Once some of the highest courts of a few of the Member States endorsed
the new constitutional construct, their counterparts in other Member States
heard more arguments that those courts should do the same, and it became more
difficult for national courts to resist the trend with any modicum of credibility.
The fact that the idea of European integration in itself held a certain appeal
could only have helped in this regard.
although they disagreed on the result, they acknowledged the linkage between the two.
50. The most radical challenge to the Court as an integrationist activist transcending the political will
of the Member States is H. RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1986),
which also critiques most books on the Court that support this approach. But see Cappelletti, Is the European
Court of Justice "Running Wild"? 12 EUR. L. REV. 3 (1987); Weiler, The Court of Justice on Trial (Review
Essay) 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 555 (1987) (reviewing H. RASMUSSEN, supra).
51. Indeed, in several of the key cases, such as Van Gend & Loos, the Court's own Advocate General
differed from the Court. For an analysis, see Stein, supra note 4. See also H. RASMUSSEN, supra note 50.
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Last, but not least, noble ideas (such as the Rule of Law and European
Integration) aside, the legally driven constitutional revolution was a narrative
of plain and simple judicial empowerment. The empowerment was not only,
or even primarily, of the European Court of Justice, but of the Member State
courts, of lower national courts in particular. Whereas the higher courts acted
diffidently at first, the lower courts made wide and enthusiastic use of the
Article 177 procedure. This is immediately understandable both on a simple
individual psychological level and on a deep institutional plane. Lower courts
and their judges were given the facility to engage with the highest jurisdiction
in the Community and thus to have de facto judicial review of legislation. For
many this would be heady stuff. Even in legal systems such as that of Italy,
which already included judicial review, the E.C. system gave judges at the
lowest level powers that had been reserved to the highest court in the land.
Institutionally, for courts at all levels in all Member States, the constitutionali-
zation of the Treaty of Rome, with principles of supremacy and direct effect
binding on governments and parliaments, meant an overall strengthening of the
judicial branch vis-a-vis the other branches of government. And the ingenious
nature of Article 177 ensured that national courts did not feel that the empower-
ment of the European Court of Justice was at their expense. 2
Finally there is a third, critical, layer, that explains the relationship between
the contrasting legal and political developments during the Foundational Period.
It might be true that the Court of Justice stepped in in the face of a political
decline. But it would be wrong to consider the relationship in exclusively
unidirectional terms. The relationship has been bidirectional and even circular.
The integrating legal developments at least indirectly influenced the disintegrat-
ing political ones.
I suggest a tentative thesis, which perhaps could even be part of a general
theory of international lawmaking. This thesis meshes neatly with Hirschman's
notion of Exit and Voice and posits a relationship between "Hard Law" and
"Hard Lawmaking." The "harder" the law in terms of its binding effect both
on and within states, the less willing states are to give up their prerogative to
control the emergence of such law or the law's "opposability" to them. When
the international law is "real," when it is "hard" in the sense of being binding
not only on but also in states, and when there are effective legal remedies to
enforce it, decisionmaking suddenly becomes important, indeed crucial.53 This
52. In some areas, such as human rights, the high courts of at least some of the Member States needed
some judicial persuasion. See supra text following note 32 and infra text following note 84.
53. For example, in the United Nations, the following structure exists: in the General Assembly,
resolutions (in principle, not binding) may be adopted by majority vote, in the Security Council, resolutions
(binding) may be vetoed by the Permanent Members. The Permanent Members must be seen, at least
partially, as representative of the major interests of the different political groupings in the General Assembly.
The Council of Europe, to a certain extent, with the exception of the human rights apparatus, has a
similar construction. Year after year the Council of Europe passes resolutions and treaties in a seemingly
effortless stream. This is so because resolutions and draft treaties of the Council of Europe do not, as such,
bind the Member States. Members can always "go home," think about individual proposals, and decide to
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is a way of explaining what happened in the Community in that period.
What we called, in Hirschmanian terms, the closure of Selective Exit was
just that: the process by which Community norms and policy hardened into
binding law with effective legal remedies. The increase in Voice was the
"natural reaction" to this process. The Member States realized the critical
importance of taking control of a decisionmaking process, the outcome of which
they would have to live with and abide by. By "natural reaction" I do not mean
to imply a simplistic causal relationship. I do not suggest that, as a direct result
of the decisions of the Court, in say, Van Gend & Loos' (in 1963) or Costa
v. ENEL 55 (in 1964), the French government decided (in 1965) to precipitate
the crisis that led to the Luxembourg Accord. I suggest that the constitutionali-
zation process created a normative construct in which such a precipitous
political development becomes understandable. Because Community norms in
terms of substance were important, 6 and because they were by then situated
in a context that did not allow selective application, control of the creation of
the norm itself was the only possible solution for individual states.
57
accept or reject them.
A similar linkage exists with relation to conclusion of multilateral treaties and the permissible regime
of reservations. Under the old regime, texts of multilateral treaties were adopted, unless otherwise provided,
by unanimous vote of the contracting parties (Enhanced Voice). The corollary was that states were highly
restricted in their ability to make reservations; these had to be accepted by all parties to the Treaty (Limited
Exit). Under the new treaty law-ushered by the Reservation to the Convention on Genocide Case, 1951
I.C.J. 15, and later by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Articles 9(2) and 19-21-the
text of a multilateral treaty could be adopted by the vote of two-thirds of the states present and voting
(Reduced Voice), but the corollary was the greater ease with which States could make reservation to such
texts. In some modern conventions such as the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention the unanimous adoption
(Enhanced Voice) was again accompanied by a prohibition on reservations (Reduced Exit). A similar
development may be noted in relation to the doctrine of the Persistent Objector in the formation of
customary law. It is clear that the modem approach to custom is more lenient towards the formation of
custom with more limited participation of states in that formation (Reduced Voice). It has been predicted
that this in turn will lead to a greater invocation by states of the doctrine of Persistent Objector (Enhanced
Exit). See Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: the Principle of the Persistent Objector in
International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985).
The relationship between decisionmaking and normative outcomes exists beyond the realm of public
law and may be found in private law institutions as well. Thus Gilmore, in discussing the evolution of
contract theory, contrasts the 19th century model, which embraced a narrow consideration theory (whereby
it was difficult to enter into a contract), but also a narrow excuse theory (difficult to get out). In our terms
this would correspond to High Voice and Restricted Exit. Twentieth century contract theory saw a move
towards "a free and easy approach to the problem of contract formation" (Reduced Voice), which "goes
hand in hand with a free and easy approach to the problem of contract dissolution or excuse" (Easy Exit).
G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 48 (1974).
54. Supra note 42.
55. Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
56. Even if the Community did not, in its initial phases, affect the lives of many citizens, it was crucial
in some important economic and political sectors, for example, agriculture.
57. It is difficult to adduce hard proof for this thesis, but the following is evocative. In the British White
Paper presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister in July 1971 advocating British accession to the
Community, the linkage is rather clear. See THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
1971, CMND 4715, 29-30 Ihereinafter THE UK AND THE ECI. In MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: REPORT ON RENEGOTIATION, 1975, CMND 6003, the linkage is actually made. In a section
entitled "The Special Nature of the Community," T 118, one finds first an explanation of "The direct
applicability of Community law in member countries," 122, corresponding to our analysis of the constitu-
tionalization and the closure of Selective Exit. Immediately afterwards, in "Power of member governments,"
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Historically (and structurally) an equilibrium was established. On the one
hand stood a strong constitutional integrative process that, in radical mutation
of the Treaty, linked the legal order of the Community with that of the Member
States in a federal-like relationship. This was balanced by a relentless and
equally strong process, also deviating radically from the Treaty, that transferred
political and decisionmaking power into a confederal procedure controlled by
the Member States acting jointly and severally.
The linkage between these two facets of the Community may explain and
even resolve several issues regarding the process of European integration.
The first issue relates to the very process of constitutionalization in the
1960's and early 1970's, a phenomenon that has been, as noted, at the center
of legal discourse about the Community. Indeed, insiders refer to this period,
especially in the jurisprudence of the European Court, as the "Heroic Period."
But, as we observed, these profound constitutional mutations took place in a
political climate that was somewhat hostile to, and suspicious of, supranational-
ism. How then-and this is the dilemma-could changes so profound, which
would normally require something akin to a constitutional convention subject
to elaborate procedures of diplomatic negotiation and democratic control, occur
with a minimal measure of political (read: Member State) opposition?58 Part
of the answer rests, of course, in the fact that constitutionalization during the
Foundational Period was judicially driven, thus attaching to itself that deep-
seated legitimacy that derives from the mythical neutrality and religious-like
authority with which we invest our supreme courts.
The explanation I suggest is derived from the Hard Law/Hard Lawmaking
theorem, from the interplay of Exit and Voice. Instead of a simple (legal) cause
and (political) effect, this subtler process was a circular one. On this reading,
the deterioration of the political supranational decisional procedures, the
suspension of majority voting in 1966, and the creation and domination of
intergovernmental bodies such as COREPER and the European Council consti-
tuted the political conditions that allowed the Member States to digest and
J 123-25, one finds: "[Tlhe importance of accommodating the interests of individual member states is
recognised in the Council's general practice of taking decisions by consensus, so that each member state
is in a position to block agreement unless interests to which it attaches importance are met." 124. The
authoritative ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EEC LAW, in interpreting the Luxembourg Accord and the veto power,
states: "the existence of that convention [veto power] was a significant factor in the decision by Denmark
and the United Kingdom, and subsequently by Greece, to enter the Communities." B:2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF EEC LAW, supra note 43, at I B 10-337.
In ERTA, supra note 28, one of the key "constitutionalizing" cases, Advocate General Dutheillet de
Lamothe seems to suggest the same type of linkage: "Finally, from the point of view of the development
of common policies, are there not grounds for fearing that the Ministers would resist the adoption of
regulations which would result in the loss, in cases not provided for by the Treaty, of their authority in
international matters?" Id. at 292.
58. Our confusion is enhanced if we consider that the changes introduced by the Single European Act
in 1986 were per se less radical, and yet necessitated a tortuous political process, including a constitutional
challenge in the supreme court of one of the Member States. See Croty v. An Taoiseach, 49 Common Mkt.
L.R. 666 (1987) (Irish Supreme Court).
[Vol. 100: 24032428
Transformation of Europe
accept the process of constitutionalization. Had no veto power existed, had
intergovernmentalism not become the order of the day, it is not clear to my
mind that the Member States would have accepted with such equanimity what
the European Court of Justice was doing. They could accept the constitutionali-
zation because they took real control of the decisionmaking process, thus
minimizing its threatening features.
Our speculation should not stop here; while this description of the legal-
political equilibrium may explain how and why the Member States were willing
to digest, or accept, the constitutional revolution, it does not explain their
interest in doing so. A theory of state action without interest analysis is incom-
plete. What, then, was the interest of the Member States in not simply accepting
the changing morphology of the Community but actually pursuing it?
The fundamental explanation is that the Member States, severally and
jointly, balanced the material and political costs and benefits of the Community.
Both the Community vision and its specific policy agenda were conceived as
beneficial to the actors. It may, at first sight, seem reasonable when thinking
about the Community and its Member States to conceive of this relationship
as a zero-sum game: the strengthening of the Community must come "at the
expense" of the Member States (and vice-versa). However, the evolution of the
Community in its Foundational Period ruptures this premise of zero-sum. The
strengthening of the Community was accompanied by the strengthening of its
Member States.59 Stanley Hoffmann gave a convincing political explanation
of this phenomenon." But the phenomenon also derives from the unique legal-
political equilibrium of the Community structure.
The interplay between the Community normative and decisionmaking
regimes, as explained above, gave each individual Member State a position of
power brokerage it never could have attained in more traditional for of interna-
tional intercourse. The constitutional infrastructure "locked" the Member States
into a communal (read: Community) decisionmaking forum with a fairly
rigorous and binding legal discipline. The ability to "go it alone" was always
somewhat curtailed, and in some crucial areas, foreclosed. The political super-
structure, with its individual veto power and intergovernmental discourse, gave
each Member State a decisive position of influence over the normative outcome.
Finally, in at least an indirect way, these basic features of the Foundational
59. It is easy to identify the interest that the small states would have in this structure: their weight in,
and power over, decisionmaking in inherently interdependent policy areas becomes incomparably larger
compared to outside arms-length negotiations. In principle this is true also for larger Member States. Cf.
THE UK AND THE EC, supra note 57, at 7-14. In addition, the larger Member States had particular interests
that could be vindicated effectively through the Community. Examples are the French interest in a European-
wide common agricultural policy and the German interest in relegitimation.
60. Hoffmann, Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNt-
TY-PAST, PRESENT & FUTURE 21, 22 (L. Tsoukalis ed. 1983).
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Period accentuate and explain a permanent feature of the Community: its so-
called democracy deficit.6
As already mentioned, the reference to "Member State" as a homogeneous
concept/actor is misleading in several ways62-- and increasingly so in an ever
more complex Community. 63 In discussing the Democracy Deficit it is more
accurate to speak instead of the "government," i.e. the executive branch, of
each Member State. Admittedly, the Treaty itself laid the seeds for the Democ-
racy Deficit by making the statal executive branch the ultimate legislator in the
Community. The decisionmaking Council members are first of all members of
their respective executive branches and thus directly representative of their
home state governments. The only democratic check on Council decisions is
a submission to the meek control of the European Parliament. Direct democratic
accountability, by design or by default, remains vested in national parliaments
to whom the members of the Council are answerable.
The mutations of the legal structure and the political process in the Founda-
tional Period impacted this basic deficiency in a variety of ways.
The process of constitutionalization, hardening Community measures into
supreme, often directly effective, laws backed with formidable enforcement
mechanisms, meant that once these laws were enacted, national parliaments
could not have second thoughts or control their content at the national, imple-
menting level. The only formal way in which accountability could be ensured
would be by tight ex ante control by national parliaments on the activities of
ministers in Community fora. This has proved largely not feasible.' The net
result is that the executive branches of the Member States often act together
as a binding legislator outside the decisive control of any parliamentary cham-
ber.
The changes in the decisionmaking processes meant that it was not simply
the Voice of the Member States that was enhanced, but the Voice of "govern-
ments." It is not entirely fanciful to surmise that the acceptability of the Com-
munity system in the Foundational Period was not simply because it vindicated
the interests of Member States but also because it enhanced the power of
governments (the executive branch) per se.
61. See D. MARQUAND, PARLIAMENT FOR EUROPE 64-66 (1979); see also Report drawn up on behalf
of the committee on Institutional Affairs on the democratic deficit in the European Community, PE Doe.
No. A 2-276/87, (Feb. 1, 1988) [hereinafter Toussaint Report].
62. See supra note 7.
63. See F. SNYDER, supra note 7, at 32-36.
64. See Sasse, The Control of the National parliaments of the Nine over European Affairs, in PARLIA-
MENTARY CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY 137 (A. Cassese ed. 1980). Denmark may be the exception.
See Mendel, The Role of Parliament in Foreign Affairs in Denmark in PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER
FOREIGN POLICY, supra, at 53, 57.
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F. Conclusions to the Foundational Period
The Foundational Period has been characterized by legal scholars as an
heroic epoch of constitution-building in Europe, as a time of laying the founda-
tion for a federal Europe. It has been described by political scientists as a nadir
in the history of European integration, as an era of crumbling supranationalism.
The thrust of my argument has been that a true understanding of this period
can only be achieved by a marriage of these two conflicting visions into a
unified narrative in which the interaction of the legal and the political, and the
consequent equilibrium, constitute the very fundamental feature of the Commu-
nity legal structure and political process.
This very feature helps explain the uniqueness and stability of the Commu-
nity for much of its life: a polity that achieved a level of integration similar to
that found only in full-fledged federal states and yet that contained unthreatened
and even strengthened Member States.
II. 1973 TO THE MID-1980'S: MUTATION OF JURISDICTION AND COMPETENCES
A. Introduction
The period of the mid-1970's to the mid-1980's is traditionally considered
a stagnant epoch in European integration. The momentum created by the acces-
sion of Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark did not last long. The Oil Crisis
of late 1973 displayed a Community unable to develop a common external
posture. Internally the three new Member States, two of which, the U.K. and
Denmark, were often recalcitrant partners, burdened the decisionmaking process,
forcing it to a grinding pace. It is not surprising that much attention was given
in that period to proposals to address a seriously deteriorating institutional
framework and to relaunch the Community.65
And yet it is in this politically stagnant period that another large scale
mutation in the constitutional architecture of the Community took place, a
mutation that has received far less attention than the constitutional revolution
in the Foundational Period. It concerned the principle of division of compe-
tences between Community and Member States.
65. See REPORT ON EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, supra note 6; Spierenburg Report, supra note 6; The
Six Reports and Resolution of the European Parliament on Institutions of July 9, 1981 (Htlnsch, Diligent,
Baduel Glorioso, Van Miert, Elles, Antoniozzi); The institutional system of the Community: Restoring the
balance, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES (Supp. 3/82) 5: French government memorandum on revitalization of
the Community, 14 BULL. EUR. COMMUNIEs (11-1981) 92; German Italian initiative: Draft European Act,
14 BULL. EUR. COMiUNITIES (11-1981) 87 (Genscher-Colombo Initiative); Report on European political
cooperation, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES \Supp. 3/81) 14. See generally, on that epoch and these proposals,
Weiler, The Genscher-Colombo Draft European Act: The Politics of Indecision, 6 J. EUR. INTEGRATION
129 (1983).
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In most federal polities the demarcation of competences between the general
polity and its constituent units is the most explosive of "federal" battlegrounds.
Traditionally, the relationsh, p in nonunitary systems is conceptualized by the
principle of enumerated powers. The principle has no fixed content and its
interpretation varies from system to system; in some it has a stricter and in
others a more relaxed construction. Typically, the strength by which this
principle is upheld (or, at least, the shrillness of the rhetoric surrounding it)
reflects the strength of the belief in the iniportance of preserving the original
distribution of legislative powers as a defining feature of the polity. Thus, there
can be little doubt about the very different ethos that underscored the evolution
of, for example, the Canadian and U.S. federalisms, in their formative periods
and beyond, regarding enumeration. Nowhere is this different ethos clearer than
in the judicial rhetoric of enumeration. The dicta of Lord Atkin66 and Chief
Justice Marshall 67 concerning powers are the theater pieces of this rhetoric.
Likewise, the recurring laments over the "death of federalism" 68 in this or that
federation are typically associated with a critique of a relaxed attitude towards
enumeration and an inevitable shift of power to the center at the expense of the
states.
The different views about the strictness or flexibility of enumeration reflects
a basic understanding of federalism and integration. Returning to the Canadi-
an/U.S. comparison, we find the Atkin and Marshall dicta reconceptualized as
follows: Wade, in the context of the Canadian experience, suggests that:
The essential elements of a federal constitution are that powers are
divided between the central and provincial governments and that neither
has legal power to encroach upon the domain of the other, except
through the proper process of constitutional amendment .... [The
spirit.., which is inherent in the whole federal situation [is] that
neither side, so to speak, should have it in its power to invade the
sphere of the other.
69
In contrast, Sandalow, reflecting on the U.S. experience, suggests that:
66. On enumeration, Lord Atkin stated:
No one can doubt that this distribution [of legislative powers between the Dominion and the
Provinces] ... is one of the most essential conditions, probably the most essential condition [in
the Canadian federal arrangement] .. .. While the ship of state now sails on larger ventures...
she still retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure.
A.-G. Canada v. A.-G. Ontario, 1937: 1 D.L.R. 673, 682-84 (P.C.).
67. Over a century before, Chief Justice Marshall asserted: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the [Clonstitution, are constitutional."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
68. E.g., van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709 (1985).
69. Wade, Amendment of the Constitution of Canada: The Role of the United Kingdom Parliament
in BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACTS: THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENT, 2 HC 42, at 102, 108 (1981) (memorandum
and evidence submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons).
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The disintegrative potential of [questions concerning the legality of
governmental action] is especially great when they [challenge] the
distribution of authority in a divided or federal system .... [Where]
Congress determines that a national solution is appropriate for one or
another economic issue, its power to fashion one is not likely to be
limited by constitutional divisions of power between it and the state
legislatures."
These differences in approach could be explained by formal differences in
the structure of the British North American Act (which predated the current
Canadian Constitution) as compared to the U.S. Constitution. But they also
disclose a principled difference in the way the two systems value enumerated
powers within the federal architecture, a difference between ends and means,
functions and values. In the Wade conception of the Canadian system the
division of powers was considered a per se value, an end in itself. The form
of divided governance was considered to be on par with the other fundamental
purposes of a government, such as obtaining security, order, and welfare, and
was viewed as part of its democratic architecture. In the United States, the
federal distribution retained its constitutional importance as the system evolved.
In practice, however, it would seem that the principle of division was subjected
to higher values and invoked as a useful means for achieving other objectives
of the U.S. union. To the extent that the division became an obstacle for the
achievement of such aims it was sacrificed.71 We may refer to this approach
as a functional one. The dichotomy is, of course, not total; we find strands of
both the functional and per se approaches in each of the systems. Nevertheless,
clear differences exist in the weight given to each of the strands and in the
evolution of the two federations. In addition, the legal debate about division
of powers was (and remains) frequently the code for battles over raw power
between different loci of governance, an aspect ultimately of crucial importance.
In Europe, the Treaty itself does not precisely define the material limits of
Community jurisdiction.72 But it is clear that, in a system that rejected a
"melting pot" ethos and explicitly in the preamble to its constituent instrument
affirms the importance of"an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,"
that saw power being bestowed by the Member State on the Community (with
residual power thus retained by the Member States) and consecrated in an
international Treaty containing a clause that effectively conditions revision of
the treaty on ratification by parliaments of all Member States,7 3 the "original"
understanding was that the principle of enumeration would be strict and that
70.. Sandalow, The Expansion of Federal Legislative Authority, in COURTS AND FREE MARKETS 49,
49-50 (1982) (I have reversed the order of quoted sentences).
71. These developments have had their critics. E.g. van Alstyne, supra note 68; cf. Amar, Of Sovereign-
ty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
72. Articles 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty set out the "tasks" or"purposes" of the Community, from which
its competences are derived in rather open-textured language.
73. EEC Treaty, art. 236.
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jurisdictional enlargement (rationae materia) could not be lightly undertaken.
This understanding was shared not only by scholars,74 but also by the Member
States and the political organs of the Community, as evidenced by their practi-
ces,75 as well as by the Court of Justice itself. In its most famous decision,
Van Gend & Loos, the Court affirmed that the Community constitutes "a new
legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited
their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields."76 And earlier, in even more
striking language, albeit related to the Coal and Steel Community, the Court
explained that,
[t]he Treaty rests on a derogation of sovereignty consented by the
Member States to supranational jurisdiction for an object strictly deter-
mined. The legal principle at the basis of the Treaty is a principle of
limited competence. The Community is a legal person of public law and
to this effect it has the necessary legal capacity to exercise its functions
but only those.
77
In light of the Member States' vigorous reaction to the constitutional
mutation of the Community during the Foundational Period, seizing effective
control of Community governance, and the fact that a lax attitude to enumera-
tion would indeed seem to result in a strengthening of the center at the expense
of the states, we would expect that this "original" understanding of strict
enumeration would be tenaciously preserved.
I characterize the period of the 1970's78 to the early 1980's as a second
and fundamental phase in the transformation of Europe. In this period the
Community order mutated almost as significantly as it did in the Foundational
Period. In the 1970's and early 1980's, the principle of enumerated powers as
a constraint on Community material jurisdiction (absent Treaty revision)
74. Judge Pescatore, who later became one of the formidable champions of an expansive and evolutive
view of the Community, offered a classic endorsement of this original narrow understanding in at least some
of its aspects. Pescatore, Les relations extirieures des Communauts europeenne, REcUILS DES COURS [RDC]
I 11961-11].
75. For example, in the enactment of Council Regulation No. 803/68, O.J. (L 148) 6, 6 (June 28, 1968),
relating to the customs value of goods, a matter at the heart of the common market and the economic sphere
of Community activity, the Council resorted to Article 235 of the Treaty as legal basis, not believing it had
inherent authority in the Customs Union provisions of the Treaty.
76. Van Gend & Loos (emphasis added).
77. Joined Cases 7/56, 3-7/57, Dinecke Algera v. Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel
Community, 1957-58 E.C.R. 39 [hereinafter Algeral.
78. 1973 seems an appropriate signpost since it followed the European Council meeting of October
1972 in which an explicit decision was made to make full (and on my reading, expansive) use of Article
235 as part of general reinvigoration of the Community. This process coincided with the accession of the
three new Member States. Declaration of Paris Summit, BULL. EUR. CoMMUNITIEs (10-1972).
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substantially eroded and in practice virtually disappeared.79 Constitutionally,
no core of sovereign state powers was left beyond the reach of the Community.
Put differently, if the constitutional revolution was celebrated in the 1960's
albeit "in limited fields," the 1970's saw the erosion. of these limits. As an
eminent authority assesses the Community today: "There simply is no nucleus
of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against the Commu-
nity.
80
The 1970's mutation I describe went largely unnoticed by the interpretive
communities in Europe: the Member States and their governments, political
organs of the Community, the Court and, to an extent, academia.8' This lack
of attention is all the more ironic and striking when it is noted that the interac-
tion among those interpretive communities brought about this fundamental
mutation. To be sure, the expansion of Community jurisdiction in the 1970's
and early 1980's was widely observed. Indeed, this growth was, as mentioned
above, willed by all actors involved.
What was not understood was that, during this process of growth and as
a result of its mechanics, the guarantees of jurisdictional demarcation between
Community and Member States eroded to the point of collapse. This cognitive
dissonance in accounts of the period is so striking that I shall attempt to explain
not only the legal-political process by which strict enumeration eroded and
practically disappeared, but also the reasons so fundamental a change in the
Community architecture was not obvious to all.
82
79. I should emphasise that my analysis is confined to the question of material competences. Organic
and institutional changes are jealously guarded. That, as shall emerge, is part of my thesis. In other words,
it is the fact that organic and institutional changes are kept under tight control (essentially conserving the
prerogatives of the Member States gained in the Foundational Period) that enables the Member States to
be lax about material demarcation.
80. Lenaerts, supra note 10, at 220. Note that Lenaerts refers in this statement to what I have termed
in this article "absorption."
81. But see Tizzano, Lo sviluppo delle competenze materiali delle Comunita europee RIWsTA DIR. EUR.
139 (1981); Sasse & Yourow, The Growth of Legislative Power of the European Communities in COURTS
AND FREE MARKETS 92 (1982).
82. The erosion ofjurisdictional limits did not mean that the Community and its Member States would
never resort to Treaty amendment. Clearly changes as to the method of exercising jurisdiction such as the
shift from unanimity to majority voting ex Article 100 would require such amendment. Not all Treaty
amendment concerns jurisdictional limits. More interestingly, even in areas where jurisdiction was already
clearly asserted, such as in the environmental field, the Member States would, for example in the Single
European Act, "reinvent the wheel." And in matters concerning monetary and economic union they are now
negotiating Treaty amendments to give effect to the new monetary constructs. My claim is that this has
become their choice-and if they had wished they could have introduced the new monetary regime ex
Article 235, easily showing, in the light of other practice concerning 235-that it was necessary for the good
functioning of the common market. There are however many advantages to pursuing the Treaty amendment
route: to mention just two, the new regime becomes entrenched and cannot be changed by simple legislation
(something important for, say, the independence of the proposed central European bank), and it enjoys a
higher level of political legitimacy since it calls for ratification by all Member State parliaments.
It is also important to understand that I am not claiming that in this period jurisdictional expansion
was quantitatively impressive. This would be strange in a Community that was decisionally stagnant. In
fact there were many areas of explicit Community competence, such as transport regulation, where nothing
was done. The interesting tale concerns the variety of new fields into which the Community moved, each
on its own of relatively little importance. In fact, it could be argued that these activities emerged as a
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Naturally, because the process itself went largely unnoticed when it oc-
curred, its far-reaching consequences and significance were not appreciated at
the time. It is a general theme of this article that the first series of mutations
in the Foundational Period conditioned those that followed in the 1970's. I
additionally argue that the consequences and significance of the then-unnoticed
mutations in the 1970's are becoming acutely transparent today in the final
phase of Community evolution. Together with the early mutations, the muta-
tions of the 1970's define the very significance of the Community's evolution.
B. A Typology of Jurisdiction in the European Community
In mapping the original understanding of the distribution of competences
of the Community and Member States in schematic terms, the following picture
emerges.
(1) there are areas of activity over which the Community has no juris-
diction;
(2) there are areas of activity that are autonomous to the Community
(therefore beyond the reach of the Member States' jurisdiction as
such); and
(3) there are large areas of activity where Community and Member
State competences overlap.
A very strict concept of enumeration would suggest that this jurisdictional
demarcation, whatever its precise content, could and should change only in
accordance with the provisions for Treaty amendment. Jurisdictional mutation
in the concept of enumeration would occur where there is evidence of substan-
tial change in this map without resort to Treaty amendment.
In fact, during the period in question, mutation thus defined occurred.
Moreover, it was not occasional or limited, but happened in a multiplicity of
forms, the combination of which leads to my claim of erosion of constitutional
guarantees of enumeration. The picture may best be grasped by thinking of
mutation as occurring in four distinct categories or prototypes.
distraction, given the Community's inability to deal with its truly pressing problems. But the cumulative
effect of all these activities was significant.
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C. The Categories of Mutation3
1. Extension
Extension is mutation in the area of autonomous Community jurisdiction.
The most striking example of this change is the well-known evolution of a
higher law of human rights in the Community. As already mentioned, the
Treaty contains elaborate provisions for review of Community measures by the
European Court of Justice.' It does not include a "Bill of Rights" against
which to measure Community acts, nor does it mention, as such, human rights
as a grounds for review. Yet, as mentioned earlier, in a process starting in 1969
but consolidated in the 1970's,85 the Court constructed a formidable 6 appara-
tus for such review. Despite legal and policy rationales, such a development
could not have occurred had the Court taken a strict view of permissible change
in the allocation of competences and jurisdiction. Had the Court taken such a
view, such a dramatic change could have taken place only by Treaty amend-
ment.
An equally striking example from an area of autonomous Community
jurisdiction concerns the standing of the European Parliament. The plain and
simple language of the Treaty would seem to preclude both action against and
by the European Parliament. 7 Yet the Court, in an expansive, systemic (and,
in my view, wholly justified s ) interpretation of the Treaty, first allowed
Parliament to be sued 89 and then, after some hesitation,9" granted Parliament
standing to sue other Community institutions. 9'
The category of extension requires four ancillary comments.
First, it must be emphasized that the analysis of extension (and indeed the
other categories of mutation) is intended, for the time being, to be value-neutral.
I do not present these examples as a critique of the Court "running wild" or
83. It is important that we do not use the term "mutation" loosely. As a "Framework Document," the
Treaty itself often calls for, or allows, change without Treaty amendment. I want to reserve the term
mutation to those instances where the change is fundamental. Obviously, as shall be seen, when mutation
does occur it is always justified by some reference to the Treaty and its "implicit" principles. It is important
to understand that I do not make a normative or interpretative argument for some construction of a legal
basis in the Treaty. The strict "legal" evaluation is of little interest in my view. My point is that the relevant
interpretative communities, by choosing to opt for the wide and flexible reading of the Treaty, have
transformed strict enumeration into a very flexible notion, practically emptied of material content in the
Community.
84. See supra text surrounding note 32.
85. For a comprehensive description and analysis of human rights jurisprudence in the Community,
see Clapham, European Union-The Human Rights Challenge in I HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW (1991).
86. For a critique, see Clapham, supra note 85; Weiler, supra note 29.
87. See EEC Treaty, art. 173.
88. Weiler, Pride and Prejudice-Parliament v Council, 14 EUR. L. REV. 334 (1989).
89. Parti Ecologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339.
90. Case 302/87, Comitology Decision of September 27, 1988 (not yet reported).
91. Case 70/88, Tchernobyl Decision of May 22, 1990 (not yet reported).
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exceeding its own legitimate interpretative jurisdiction. Evaluating these devel-
opments, to which I shall return later, involves considerations far wider and
weightier than the often arid discussion of judicial propriety. What is important,
if there is any force in my argument, is the recasting of known judicial develop-
ments, usually analyzed in other legal contexts,92 as data in the analysis of
jurisdictional mutation.
Second, in the case of extension, the principal actor instigating extension
was the Court itself, although, of course, at the behest of some plaintiff. Other
actors played a more passive role. The action of the Court must be viewed
simultaneously as reflective of a flexible, functional approach to enumeration
and constitutive of such an ethos in the Community.
Third, this jurisdictional mutation, despite the radical nature of the measures
themselves, was rather limited, since it was confined to changes within the
autonomous sphere of the Community and did not have a direct impact on the
jurisdiction of the Member States. Indeed, the human rights jurisprudence
actually curtailed the freedom of action of the Community. 93 The changes of
standing concerning the Parliament were similar in potentially chilling the
legislative power of Commission and Council, although in a more muted form.
Finally, and perhaps not altogether surprisingly, these developments and
others like them were, with limited exceptions, both welcomed and accepted
by the different interpretative communities in Europe, partly because they were
seen as pertaining to the other legal categories and partly because they did not
encroach directly on the Member State jurisdiction. (In any event, these devel-
opments were hardly perceived as pertaining to the question of jurisdictional
demarcation.)
2. Absorption
Absorption is a far deeper form of mutation. It occurs, often unintentionally,
when the Community legislative authorities, in exercising substantive legislative
powers bestowed on the Community, impinge on areas of Member State
jurisdiction outside the Community's explicit competences.
One of many striking illustrations94 is offered by the events encapsulated
in the Casagrande case.95
Donato Casagrande, an Italian national, son of Italian migrant workers, lived
all his life in Munich. In 1971 and 1972 he was a pupil at the German Fridtjof-
92. Thus the human rights jurisprudence has been discussed essentially as part of a debate on judicial
review and not seen as an issue of enumerated powers. Likewise, the issue of Parliamentary sanding has
been seen as an issue of procedure and institutional balance but, again, not as one of enumeration ethos.
93. Indirectly of course, this curtails the freedom of the Member States acting qua Council of the
Community.
94. See, e.g., Joined Cases 6 & 11/69, EEC Commission v. France, 1969 E.C.R. 523 and the discussion
thereof in Lenaerts, supra note 10.
95. Case 9/74, Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Manchen, 1974 E.C.R. 773 [hereinafter Casagrande].
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Nansen-Realschule. The Bavarian law on educational grants (BayAfdG) entitles
children who satisfy a means test to receive a monthly educational grant from
the Linder. The city of Munich refused his application for a grant relying on
Article 3 of the same educational law, which excluded from entitlement all non-
Germans except stateless people and aliens residing under a right of asylum.
Casagrande, in an action seeking a declaration of nullity of the educational
law, relied principally on Article 12 of Council Regulation 1612/68.96 The
article provides that "the children of a national of a Member State who is or
has been employed in the territory of another Member State shall be admitted
to that State's general educational, apprenticeship, and vocational training
courses under the same conditions as the nationals of that State, if such children
are residing in its territory." Further, the Member States must encourage "all
efforts to enable such children to attend these courses under the best possible
conditions."
97
The Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht, in an exemplary understanding of the
role of review of the European Court of Justice, sought a preliminary ruling
on the compatibility of the Bavarian educational provision with Article 12 of
the Council Regulation.
The submission of the Bavarian public prosecutor's office (Staatsan-
waltschaft), which intervened in the case, illustrated the issue of powers and
mutation well. It was submitted that the Council exceeded its powers under
Articles 48 and 49 of the EEC Treaty.98 These Articles concern the conditions
of workers. "Since individual educational grants come under the sphere of
educational policy [in respect of which the Council has no jurisdiction] ... it
is to be inferred that the worker can claim the benefit of assimilation with
nationals [as provided in Article 12] only as regards social benefits which have
a direct relation with the conditions of work itself and with the family stay."99
Under this view, Article 12 of the Regulation must be read as entitling
children of migrants to be admitted to schools under the same conditions as
children of citizens, but not to receive educational grants. If we give the
Bavarian public prosecutor's assertion its strongest reading, he denied the very
possibility of a conflict between Article 12 and the Bavarian BayAf6G, since
Article 12 simply could not apply to educational grants. Under a weaker
interpretation, he was pleading for a narrow interpretation of the Article 12
provision because of the jurisdictional issue. Underlying this submission was
the deeper ground that if education is outside the Community competence, then
the Regulation itself transgressed the demarcation line. In any event, the
interpretation sought by Casagrande could not stand.
96. 1968 O.J. (L 257) 2.
97. Id. at art. 12.
98. Casagrande, 1974 E.C.R., at 776.
99. Id.
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How then did the Court deal with the question? One can detect two phases
in the process ofjudicial consideration. The first phase consisted of an interpre-
tation of the specific Community provision in an effort to understand its full
scope. While engaging in this phase the Court acted as if it were in an empty
jurisdictional space with no limitations on the reach of Community law. Not
surprisingly, the Court's rendering of Regulation 12 led it to the conclusion that
the Article did cover the distribution of grants."
In the second phase of analysis the Court addressed the jurisdictional
mutation problem.' °' We must remember that the primary ground for the
illegality of a measure, the infringement of the Treaty, certainly includes
jurisdictional competence.02 The Court first acknowledged that "educational
and training policy is not as such included in the spheres that the Treaty had
entrusted to the Community institutions."'0 3 The allusion to the Community
institutions is important: the case after all deals with an issue of "secondary
legislation" enacted by the political organs. But, in the key, although oblique,
phrase the Court continued, "it does not follow that the exercise of powers
transferred to the Community," enlarging thus the language from Community
institutions to the Community as a whole and hence from secondary legislation
to the entire Treaty, "is in some way limited if it is of such a nature as to
affect... [national] measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that
of education and training."'" Now we understand the importance of the two-
phased judicial analysis.
In phase one the Court explained the meaning of a Community measure.
The interpretation may be teleological but not to the same extent as the Court's
performance in the evolution of the higher law of human rights. Absorption is
in this way distinguishable from extension. In the second phase, the Court
stated that to the extent that national measures, even in areas over which the
Community has no competence, conflict with the Community rule, these
national measures will be absorbed and subsumed by the Community measure.
The Court said that it was not the Community policy that was encroaching on
national educational policy; rather, it was the national educational policy that
was impinging on Community free-movement policy and thus must give way.
The category of absorption also calls for some interim commentary. First,
in this higher form of mutation at least two interpretative communities are
playing a role in the erosion of strict enumeration: principally the legislative
interpretative community, comprising in this case the Commission, Parliament,
and the Council (with a decisive role for the governments of the Member
100. Casagrande, at Judgment Recitals 8, 9.
101. Casagrande, at Judgment Recitals 10-15.
102. See EEC Treaty, art. 173.
103. Casagrande, at Judgment Recital 12 (emphasis added).
104. Id. (emphasis added).
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States), and the judicial one.t 5 This is important in relation to the question
of the acceptance of the overall mutation of jurisdictional limits. As a simple
examination of extension might have indicated, it cannot be seen as a judicially
led development, although legal sanctioning by the Court plays an important
role in encouraging this type of legislation in future cases.
Second, the limits of absorption are important. Although absorption extends
the effect of Community legislation outside the Community jurisdiction, it,
critically, does not give the Community original legislative jurisdiction (in, for
example, the field of education). The Community could not, in light of Casa-
grande, directly promulgate its own full-fledged educational policy.
This distinction should not diminish the fundamental importance of absorp-
tion and its inclusion as an important form of mutation. This can be gauged by
trying to imagine the consequences of a judicial policy that would deny this
possibility of absorption. The scope of effective execution of policy over which
the Community had direct jurisdiction would, in a society in which it is impos-
sible to draw neat demarcation lines between areas of social and economic
policy, be significantly curtailed. But at the same time there is a clear sacrifice
and erosion of the principle of enumeration. And, of course, the absorption
doctrine invokes a clear preference for Community competence over Member
State competence. In a sense the language of the Court suggests a simple
application of the principle of supremacy. But this is not a classical case of
supremacy. After all, in relation to issues of jurisdiction, supremacy may only
mean that each level of government is supreme in the fields assigned to it. Here
we have a case of conflicts of competences. The Court is suggesting that in
such conflicts Community competence must prevail. This is the doctrinal crux
of absorption.
3. Incorporation
t06
The term is borrowed from the constitutional history of the United States
and denotes the process by which the federal Bill of Rights, initially perceived
as applying to measures of the federal government alone, was extended to state
action through the agency of the Fourteenth Amendment. The possibility of
incorporation within the Community system appears at first sight improbable.
We noted already the absence of a Community "Bill of Rights." Community
incorporation would entail not one but two acts of high judicial activism. First,
the creation of judge-made higher law for the Community, and then its applica-
tion to acts of the Member States.
105. The case highlights the fiction of assimilating government with Member State. Bavaria is as much
a part of the Federal Republic of Germany as the central German government.
106. 1 dealt with this issue extensively in Weiler, The European Court at a Cross Roads: Community
Human Rights and Member State Action, in DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DRO1T DE L'INT-GRATION 821
(F. Caportorti ed. 1987), and present here merely the bare bones of the argument.
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Looking at this issue not through the prism of human rights discourse, but
as a problem of jurisdictional allocation, suggests that incorporation may not,
after all, be so inconceivable. In the field of human rights, incorporation
invokes no more than a combination of extension and absorption. The frequency
and regularity by which these two other forms of Community mutation are
exercised suggest that incorporation is a distinct possibility.
The interplay of the actors in pushing for this form of mutation is interest-
ing. In an early case, the Court, of its own motion, seemed to open the door
to this development. In subsequent cases, the Commission pushed hard for such
an outcome, but the Court's responses have been mixed. In some cases it
seemed to be nodding in this direction, while in other cases it firmly rejected
the possibility.107
I cannot therefore present incorporation as afait accompli in the evolving
picture of mutation of jurisdictional limits. But the concept, even in its current
embryonic Community form, is important for two reasons.
First, it shows again the internal interplay of the various actors in pushing
the frontiers of Community jurisdiction. At times it is the Court; at other times
the legislative organs in conjunction with the Court; at other times still the
Commission trying, as in the Cinithdque case, to enlist the Court's support (in
this case rather unsuccessfully'08 ).
Second, it shows the dynamics of the of enumeration. That incorporation
could be tried, more than once-at first causing a split between the opinions
of the Court and its Advocate General, which later developed into a somewhat
bifurcated jurisprudence' 09 -is only conceivable in a legal-political environ-
ment which has already moved, through the agencies of extension and incorpo-
ration, far away from a strict concept of enumeration.
4. Expansion and its Causes
Expansion is the most radical form of jurisdictional mutation. Whereas
absorption concerned Community legislation in a field in which the Community
had clear original jurisdiction, and describes a mutation occurring when the
effects of such legislation spill over into fields reserved to the Member States,
expansion refers to the case in which the original legislation of the Community
"breaks" jurisdictional limits.
I have already alluded to the expansive approach to implied powers adopted
by the Court as part of the constitutionalization process in the Foundational
Period. If expansively applied, the implied powers doctrine may have the de
facto consequence of permitting the Community to legislate and act in a manner
107. For cases and analysis, see Weiler, supra note 106.
108. See Case 60-61/84, Cinth~que S.A. v. Federation National des Cindmas Francais, 1985 E.C.R.
2605.
109. For discussion, see Weiler, supra note 106, at 824-30.
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not derived from clear grants of power in the Treaty itself. This would not
constitute veritable expansion. The implied powers doctrine is not veritable
expansion because typically the powers implied are in an area in which the
Community clearly is already permitted to act, and the powers to act would be
construed precisely as "instruments" enabling effective action in a permissible
field. Thus, in the leading case of implied powers,110 there was no question
that the Community could act in the field of transport policy; what the Court
did was to enable it, within this field, to conclude international agreements.
Even though the implied powers doctrine cannot be construed strictly as
true expansion as defined above, it is important in this context. First, the way
a court approaches the question of implied powers is in itself an indirect reflec-
tion of its attitude toward enumeration. Even if implying powers as such does
not constitute a mutation, a court taking a restrictive approach to enumeration
will tend to be cautious in implying powers, whereas a court taking a function-
al, flexible approach to enumeration will be bolder in its implied powers
jurisprudence. It is interesting that the European Court of Justice itself has
changed its attitude toward implied powers and, by implication, toward enu-
meration. In its very early jurisprudence, it took a cautious and reserved
approach to implied powers; it was really only in a second phase that it
changed direction on this issue as part of the process of constitutionaliza-
tion."1
Second, even though, strictly speaking, the implied powers doctrine is
intended to give the Community an instrument in a field within which it already
has competence, these distinctions often break down in reality. When the Court
in the 1970's considered and construed the powers that flowed from the com-
mon commercial policy, it did, even on a very conservative reading, extend the
jurisdictional limits of the Community.'
It is, however, in the context of Article 235 of the Treaty that we find the
locus of true expansion. Article 235 is the "elastic clause" of the Communi-
ty-its "necessary and proper" provision. Article 235 provides that:
if action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives
of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the necessary
110. See ERTA, supra note 28, at 273, 290.
Ill. Compare Algera, supra note 77 (denying right to set aside administrative measures) with ERTA,
supra note 28 (establishing right to enter into agreements with third countries).
112. See, e.g., Opinion 1/78, Opinion given pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 238(1) of
the EEC Treaty, 1979 E.C.R. 2871 9 (Rubber). The Council (and France and Britain as interveners) claimed
that conclusion of the Rubber Agreement, as an instrument of Cooperation and Development which also
impinges on broader strategic concerns of the Member States, was outside the scope and competence of
the Community's Common Commercial Policy. The Court gave an extensive reading to the limits of the
exclusive (!) Common Commercial Policy and held that, "it is clear that a coherent commercial policy would
no longer be practicable if the Community were not in a position to exercise its powers also in connexion
with a category of agreements which are becoming, alongside traditional commercial agreements, one of
the major factors in the regulation of international trade." Id. at 2912, Recital 43.
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powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the
appropriate measures.
On its face, this is no more than a codified version of an implied powers
doctrine; clearly, Article 235 should not be used to expand the jurisdiction of
the Community (which derives from its objectives and functional definition as
explicitly and implicitly found elsewhere in the Treaty) by adding new objec-
tives or amending existing ones. Since however the language of the Article is
textually ambiguous, and concepts such as "objectives" are by their nature
open-textured, there has been a perennial question how far beyond the literal
Treaty definition of the Community's spheres of activities and powers the use
of Article 235 will permit without actually amending the Treaty.
The history of Article 235 in legislative practice, judicial consideration, and
doctrine includes several changes which reflect the changes in the development
of the Community itself.
In the period 1958 to 1973, Article 235 was used by Community institutions
relatively infrequently" 3 and, when used, was usually narrowly construed.
Under the restrictive view, shared by all interpretative communities at the
time," 4 the function of Article 235 was to compensate within an area of
activity explicitly granted by the Treaty for the absence of an explicit grant of
legal power to act. Two examples demonstrate the early conception of the
Article. One was the enactment on the basis of Article 235, in 1968, of Regula-
tion 803/68 on Customs Valuation, setting out the criteria by which the value
of imported goods to the Community for the purpose of imposing customs
duties would be calculated. Implicit in this recourse to Article 235 was the
belief that:
(1) customs valuation was necessary to attain the objectives of the
Treaty; but
(2) since the reach of the Community spheres of activity had to be
narrowly construed, one could not use the'common commercial
policy or Article 28 as a legal basis, as these did not explicitly
cover customs valuation.
A second example is the use of Article 235 as a legal basis for extending
the list of food products in Annex II to the Treaty."t5 Here it was clear that
113. For quantitative analysis, see J. WEILER, IL SISTEMA COMUNITARIO EUROPEO 195 (1985).
114. E.g., Usher, The Gradual Widening of European Community Policy on the Basis of Article 100
and 235 of the EEC Treaty in STRUCTURE AND DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICY 30 (198S)
("Article 235 was obviously intended as an exceptional measure.").
115. Article 38(3) of the EEC Treaty provides, inter alia, that "products subject to [the Common
Agricultural Policy of the EEC] are listed in Annex II to this Treaty." It also explicitly foresees that this
list should be enlarged by adding new products. And yet despite this explicit invitation the political organs
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the sphere of activities did cover the measure in question, but that there was
no specific grant of power in relation to new products. Recourse to Article 235
seemed necessary. The explanation for this restrictive quantitative and qualita-
tive usage is simple. Quantitatively, in that phase of establishing the basic
structures of the Community system, the Treaty was relatively explicit in
defining the legislative agenda and granting legal powers. The initial legislative
program simply did not call for frequent recourse to Article 235. Qualitatively,
that period, especially since the mid-1960's, was characterized by a distinct
decline in the "political will" of at least some of the Member States to promote
expansion of Community activity.
Following the Paris Summit of 1972, where the Member States explicitly
decided to make full use of Article 235 and to launch the Community into a
variety of new fields, recourse to Article 235 as an exclusive or partial legal
basis rose dramatically.
Therefore from 1973 until the entry into force of the SEA, there was not
only a very dramatic quantitative increase in the recourse to Article 235, but
also a no less dramatic understanding of its qualitative scope. In a variety of
fields, including, for example, conclusion of international agreements, the
granting of emergency food aid to third countries, and creation of new institu-
tions, tt6 the Community made use of Article 235 in a manner that was simply
not consistent with the narrow interpretation of the Article as a codification of
implied powers doctrine in its instrumental sense. Only a truly radical and
"creative" reading of the Article could explain and justify its usage as, for
example, the legal basis for granting emergency food aid to non-associated
states.'t 7 But this wide reading, in which all political institutions partook,"t8
meant that it would become virtually impossible to find an activity which could
did not believe that they had the power to amend the list without recourse to Article 235.
116. For fuller accounts of the wide use and wide construction, see, e.g., Usher, supra note 114; H.
SMIT & P. HERZOG, 6 LAv OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrY 269 (1991).
117. The Community Framework Regulations on food aid policy and food aid management were
initially based jointly on Article 43 (Common Agricultural Policy) and Article 235 of the EEC Treaty. See
Council Food Aid First Framework Regulation No. 3391/82, 1982 O.J. (L 352) 1; Council Food Aid Second
Framework Regulation No. 3972/86, O.J. (L 370) 1 (1986), as amended by Regulation No. 1930/90, O.J.
(L 174) 6 (1990), is based exclusively on Article 235. Before the adoption of Framework Regulations there
were a few decisions on emergency operations which were based exclusively on Article 235. See, e.g.,
Council Regulation No. 1010/80, 1980 O.J. (L 108) 1; Council Regulation No. 3827/81, 1981 O.J. (L 392)
1 (both concerning supply of sugar to UNRWA as food aid for refugees); Council Regulation No. 3723/81
1981 O.J. (L 373) 11 (concerning the supply of exceptional food aid to the least developed countries). So
long as the food aid is a mechanism for disposal of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) surpluses there
is no question of legal basis and competence based on Article 43 of the EEC Treaty. The inclusion of Article
235 would cover the incidence of food aid that is not so tied to CAP objectives and mechanisms. The current
exclusive reliance on 235 is deliberate in order to disconnect food aid from the CAP and emphasize that
it is not an instrument of the CAP. Laudable as the granting of food aid is, it is difficult to see how the
functioning of the common market, a condition for the recourse to Article 235, is served by granting
humanitarian food aid to non-associated countries. But see Marenco, Les Conditions d'Application de
l'Article 235 du Traite CEE, 12 REVUE DU MARCH9 COMMUN [RMC] 147 (1970).
118. Parliament has pushed for the usage of Article 235 as well, since, inter alia, it is one of the
provisions under which consultation with Parliament is obligatory.
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not be brought within the "objectives of the Treaty."" 9 This constituted the
climax of the process of mutation and is the basis for my claim not merely that
no core activity of state function could be seen any longer as still constitutional-
ly immune from Community action (which really goes to the issue of absorp-
tion), but also that no sphere of the material competence could be excluded
from the Community acting under Article 235. It is not simply that the jurisdic-
tional limits of the Community expanded in their content more sharply in the
1970's than they did as a result of, for example, the Single European Act. The
fundamental systemic mutation of the 1970's, culminating in the process of
expansion, was that any sort of constitutional limitation of this expansion
seemed to have evaporated.
It is important to emphasize again that, for this inquiry, the crucial question
is not the per se legality of the wide interpretation of Article 235.120 In the
face of a common understanding by all principal interpretative communities,
that question has little if any significance and perhaps no meaning."' Far
119. Elsewhere I have argued, tongue in cheek, that, on this reading defense would also be a permissi-
ble usage of Article 235, since the common market could hardly function with the territories of the Member
States under occupation. J. WEILER, supra note 113, at 188. For broad interpretation of the "objectives"
of the Community, see Case 242/87, Commission v. Council, 1989 E.C.R. 1425 [hereinafter Erasmus].
120. The Court tacitly sanctioned this wide usage. Broadly speaking, two principal conditions must
'be fulfilled to invoke Article 235. The measure must be "necessary," in the course of the operation of the
common market, to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty. In addition, Article 235 may be used when
the Treaty does not provide the "necessary" powers. The Court addressed both conditions liberally in the
leading case of the early period, Case 8/73, Hauptzollanmt Bremerhaven v. Massey Ferguson GmbH, 1973
E.C.R. 897 [hereinafter Massey Ferguson]. Regarding the second, the Court was explicit. In an action for
annulment of the regulation adopting the above-mentioned Community customs valuation regime, the Court
had to decide whether reliance on Article 235 as an exclusive basis was justified. While acknowledging
that a proper interpretation of the alternative legal bases in the EEC Treaty (arts. 9, 27, 28, 111, & 113)
would provide an adequate legal basis, and thus, under a strict construction, render Article 235 not
"necessary," the Court, departing from an earlier statement, nonetheless considered that the Council's use
of Article 235 would be "justified in the interest of legal certainty." Massey Ferguson, supra, at 908.
Legally, this might have been an unfortunate formulation since an aura of uncertainty almost ipso facto
attaches to a decision to make recourse to Article 235. Politically, it may have been wise, for a more rigid
interpretation could have thwarted the desire of the Member States, consonant with the Treaty objectives,
to expand greatly the areas of activity of the Community, even if by dubious use of Article 235. Practically
speaking, recourse to Article 235 in that period made little difference in the content of measures adopted
because virtually all measures were adopted under the penumbra of de facto unanimity. Taking their cue
from this case, Community institutions henceforth made liberal use of Article 235 without exhaustively
considering whether other legal bases existed. Regarding the first requirement that the measure be "neces-
sary" to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty, the Court was willing to construe Community legal reach
and the notion of objectives very widely, not only in a whole range of cases not directly concerned with
235, but also in Massey Ferguson itself. Since Member States had the ability to control the usage of Article
235, disagreements, often acrimonious, on the proper scope to be given to the first condition were resolved
within the Council and not brought before the Court.
121. The doctrinal writing continues the attempt to ascribe material limitations on the usage of Article
235 even in the face of this overwhelming practice. THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAW is a typical example:
"Art. 235 does not open unlimited opportunity to increase the powers of the Community. In the first place,
recourse to Art. 235 is limited by the objectives of the Treaty." Then comes the retreat: "Extensive
interpretation as to the nature of these objectives is, of course, always possible, but the strongest guarantee
against abuse is the required unanimity of the Council ... " B:2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EC LAW, supra note
43, at B 10/70/19, General Note to Article 235, (Release 40:23-ix-86). The learned commentator implicitly
admits the futility of the task and then, abandoning an analytical attempt to circumscribe the Article in
normative terms, resorts to an institutional guarantee, as if the Council could not itself, even if acting
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more intriguing and far more revealing is to explore the explanation for and
the significance of the phenomenon. One should not, after all, underestimate
its enormity in comparison to other nonunitary (federal) systems. Not only did
the Community see in this second phase of its systemic evolution ajurisdiction-
al movement as profound as any that has occurred in federal states, but even
more remarkable, indeed something of a double riddle, this mutation did not,
on the whole, ignite major "federal" political disputes between the actors (for
example, between the Member States and the Community).
No one factor can explain a process so fundamental in the architecture of
the Community. I suggest the following as some of the more important factors
of this change.
a. Incrementalism
Part of the explanation to the riddles can be found already in the very
description I offered of the process of jurisdictional mutation. There is no single
event, no landmark case, that could be called the focal point of the mutation.
Even some of the important cases I mentioned, such as those in the field of
human rights, were not seen through the prism of jurisdictional mutation.
Instead, there was a slow change of climate and ethos whereby strict enu-
meration was progressively, relentlessly, but never dramatically, eroded. Exten-
sion, absorption, incorporation, and powers implied by the Court, all feed on
each other in cog-and-wheel fashion so that no dissonances are revealed within
the constitutional architecture itself as it is changing. When the Court is very
activist in an area, in extension, for example, it is so toward the Community
as such and not the more sensitive Member States." By contrast, in the cases
of absorption and expansion, areas where the mutative effect impinges on
Member State jurisdiction, the role of the Court is in a kind of "active passi-
vism," reacting to impulses coming from the political organs and opting for the
flexible rather than strict notion of enumeration. In its entire history there is
not one case, to my knowledge, where the Court struck down a Council or
Commission measure on grounds of Community lack of competence."-3 The
unanimously, abuse Article 235. Where writers try to insist on material limits, they end up flying in the
face of the legislative practice. See. e.g., LESGUILLONS, EXTENSION DES COMPETENCE DE LA CEE PAR
L'ARTICLE 235 DU TRAITE DE ROME AFDI 996 (1974); Lachmann, Some Danish Reflections on the Use
ofArticle 235 of the Rome Treaty, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 447 (198 1). For other more or less successful
attempts, see Giardina, The Rule of Law and Implied Powers in the European Communities 1 ITAL Y.B.
99 (1975); Marenco, supra note 117: Olmi, La place de l'article 235 CEE dans le systeme des attribution
de competence de la Communautti, in MELANGES F. DEHOUSSE 279 (1979); Waelbroeck, Article 235, in
15 LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUT- ECONOMIQUE EUROP9ENNE 521, 530 (1987).
122. The exception to this institutional "coziness" is the case law concerning the "exclusive" compe-
tence of the Community. See Weiler, The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the
Federal Principle, supra note 29, at 71-72.
123. There have been many cases of annulment of Council and Commission measures, but not on
grounds that the Community exceeded its competences. In Joined Cases 281, 283-85, 287/85, F.R.G. v.
Commission of the Eur. Communities, 1987 E.C.R. 3203 (Re: The Immigration of Non-Community
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relationship between Court and political organs was a bit like the offense in
American football. 1" The Court acted as the "pass protectors" from any con-
stitutional challenge; the political organs and the Member States made the
winning pass.
Nevertheless, incrementalism alone cannot explain a change so radical and
a reaction so muted. Politically, the Community architecture at the end of the
Foundational Period was unlike any other federal polity. Therein lies one
emphatically important aspect of this development. Even if the judicial signals
indicated that strict enumeration would not be enforced by the Court, these
could, after all, have remained without a response by the political organs and
the Member States.
Two factors, one historical and one structural, combine to explain the
aggressiveness with which the political process rushed through the opening
judicial door. Both factors are rooted in the heritage of the Foundational Period.
b. A Strategy of Revival
In a determined effort commencing in 1969,15 the end of the de Gaulle
era, and culminating in the successful negotiation of the British, Danish, and
Irish accessions in 1973, the Community sought ways to revitalize itself, to
Workers), the Court annulled a Commission decision as going beyond the scope of Commission's powers
under Article 118. The parties invited the Court to consider the social sector as being the preserve of the
Member States, "from which it follows that, like all the other fundamental choices made in the Treaty, that
choice may only be amended by use of the procedure provided for in Article 236." Id. at 3232. The Court,
however, pointedly refrained from endorsing that proposition, gave a wide reading to the scope of action
of the Community in the social field, and annulled the decision on the grounds that the Commission
exceeded its power', not that the Community had no competence in the field. In Recitals 23 and 24 of the
judgment the Court said,
[Mligration policy is capable of falling within the social field within the meaning of Article 118
only to the extent to which it concerns the situation of workers from non-member countries as
regards their impact on the Community employment market and working condition. As a result,
in so far as Decision 85/38 I/EEC includes the promotion of cultural integration as a whole among
the subjects for consultation it goes beyond the social field in which, under Article 118, the
Commission has the task of promoting cooperation between Member States.
This judgment has been read as a decision implicitly excluding cultural integration from Community
competence. Bradley, The European Court and the Legal Basis of Community Legislation, 13 EUR. L. REV.
379, 384 (1988). I disagree with this reading. The Court specifically mentions that it is interpreting the
meaning of the social field within the meaning of Article 118, which is special in that it gives certain powers
to the Commission. In the light of the broad reading given by the Court to the scope of Community
objectives in the context of Article 235. Compare Erasmus, supra note 119 (where the Court construed the
objectives of the Community to include the enhancement of the quality of teaching and formation furnished
by Community universities with a view to insure the competitiveness of the Community in world markets
and also "the general objective" of creating a citizens' Europe). This underlies the broad reading of the term
'objectives' which will be sanctioned by the Court. I submit that, had the same decision been made by the
Council on the legal basis of Articles 118 and 235, the Court would have, in the light of the judgment, held
it to be within Community competence.
124. Of which, despite five years in the Midwest, I am still happily ignorant of most nuances.
125. Prompted by and reflected in the Report of the Working Party examining the problem of the
enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament, BULL. EUR. COMMUNrIIS (Supp. 4/72) 1 (Vedel
Report).
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shake off the hangovers of the Luxembourg Crisis, to extricate itself from the
traumas of the double British rejection, and to launch itself afresh. The Paris
Summit of 1972, in which the new Member States participated, introduced an
ambitious program of substantive expansion of Community jurisdiction and a
revival of the dream of European union. Article 235 was to play a key role in
this revival. In retrospect this attempt was a failure, since the Community was
unable to act in concert on the issues that really mattered during the 1970's,
such as developing a veritable industrial policy or even tackling with sufficient
vigor Member State obstacles to the creation of the common market. The
momentum was directed to a range of ancillary issues, such as environmental
policy, consumer protection, energy, and research, all important of course, but
a side game at the time. Yet, although these were not taken very seriously in
substance (and maybe because of that), each required extensive and expansive
usage of Article 235 and represented part of the brick-by-brick demolition of
the wall circumscribing Community competences.
c. Structuralism: The Abiding Relevance of Exit and Voice
But the structural, rather than historical, explanation of the process of
expansion and its riddles is the critical one. The process of decline in the
decisional supranational features of the Community during the Foundational
Period, demonstrated by the enhanced Voice of the Member States in the
Community policymaking and legislative processes, was the key factor giving
the Member States the confidence to engage in such massive jurisdictional
mutation and to accept it with relative equanimity.
In federal states, such a mutation would by necessity be at the expense of
Member State government power. In the post-Foundational Period Community,
in contrast, by virtue of the near total control of the Member States over the
Community process, the community appeared more as an instrument in the
hands of the governments rather than as a usurping power. The Member State
governments, jointly and severally, were confident that their interests were
served by any mutative move.1 26 If the governments of the Member States
could control each legislative act, from inception through adoption and then
implementation, why would they fear a system in which constitutional guaran-
tees of jurisdictional change were weakened? Indeed, they had some incentive,
in transferring competences to the Community, to escape the strictures, or nui-
sance, of parliamentary accountability. In federal states, the classical dramas
of federalism in the early formative periods presuppose two power centers: the
central and the constituent parts. In the Community, in its post-Foundational
Period architecture, the constituent units' power was the central power.
126. To be sure, Article 235 provides for unanimity; Member State confidence was boosted because
of the knowledge that also in the implementation of any measure their interests would be guaranteed.
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As we see in several cases from that period, it was hardly feasible political-
ly, although it was permissible legally, for a Member State to approve an
"expansive" Community measure and to challenge its constitutionality as ultra
vires.I27 It is easy also to understand why the Commission (and Parliament)
played the game. The Commission welcomed the desire to reinvigorate the
Community and to expand its (and the Commission's own) fields of activity.
Since most Community decisionmaking at that time was undertaken in the
shadow of the veto consecrated by the dubiously legal Luxembourg Accord,
the Commission found no disadvantage, and in fact many advantages, in using
Article 235. Neither the Commission, nor Parliament, which was to be consult-
ed under the Article 235 procedure, were likely to challenge judicially the
usage. Moreover, since Article 235 enabled the adoption of "measures,"
whether regulations, directives, or decisions, it provided a flexibility not always
available when using other legal bases.
D. Evaluating the Mutation of Jurisdictional Limits and the Erosion of Strict
Enumeration in the 1970's.
The process of mutation is evidence of the dynamic character of the Com-
munity and its ability to adapt itself in the face of new challenges. It is also
evidence that what were perceived as negative and debilitating political events
in the 1960's had unexpected payoffs. I do not believe that the Community
would have developed such a relaxed and functional approach to mutation had
the political process not placed so much power in the hands of the Member
States. Yet even then at least two long-term problems were taking root.
1. The Question of Constitutionality
I have argued that the de facto usage of Article 235, from 1973 until the
Single European Act, implied a construction, shared by all principal interpretive
communities, that opened up practically any realm of state activity to the
Community, provided the governments of the Member States found accord
among themselves. This raised two potential problems of a constitutional nature.
From the internal, autonomous legal perspective, it is clear that Article 235
could not be construed simply as a procedural device for unchecked jurisdic-
tional expansion. Such a construction would empty Article 236 (Treaty Revi-
sion) of much of its meaning and would be contrary to the very structure of
Article 235. Legal doctrine was quick to find autonomous internal constructions
127. A Member State may challenge an act even if it voted in favor of it. Case, 166/78, Government
of the Italian Republic v. Council of the Eur. Communities, 1979 E.C.R. 2575, 2596. But it will normally
not choose to challenge on grounds of lack of competence. In Case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R.
1099, Italy was sued by the Commission for failure to implement an environmental protection directive,
the vires of which (pre-SEA) could have been challenged in defense; Italy explicitly elected not to do so.
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which would not empty the Article of meaning, but which would emphasize
its virtually limitless substantive scope. Thus it has been suggested that Article
235 cannot be used in a way that would actually violate the Treaty. t" Few
writers (or actors) sought to check the expansive use of the Article. 29 The
general view had been (and in many quarters remains) that the requirement of
unanimity does effectively give the necessary guarantees to the Member States.
If there has been a debate over the Article's meaning, it concerns the analytical
construction of the Article. The Community is no different from any other legal
polity. Language, especially such contorted language as found in Article 235,
has never been a serious constraint on a determined political power.
The constitutional problem with an expansive interpretation of Article 235,
and in general with the entire erosion of strict enumeration, does not thus rest
in the realm of autonomous positivist legalisms.
The constitutional danger is of a different nature. As we saw, results of the
constitutional "revolution" of the Community in the 1960's and the system of
judicial remedies upon which they rest depend on creating a relationship of
trust, a new community of interpretation, in which the European Court of
Justice and Member State courts play complementary roles.
The overture of the European Court toward the Member State courts in the
original constitutionalizing decisions, such as Van Gend & Loos, was based on
ajudicial-constitutional contract idea. Suggesting that the new legal order would
operate "in limited fields,"' t30 the European Court was not simply stating a
principle of European Community law, which, as the maker of that principle,
it would later be free to abandon. It was inviting the supreme Member State
courts to accept the new legal order with the understanding that it would,
indeed, be limited in its fields.
The acceptance by the Member State legal orders was premised, often
explicitly, on that understanding. Thus the Italian Constitutional Court, when
it finally accepted supremacy, did so "on the basis of a precise criterion of
division of jurisdiction."1
3t
The danger in this process is now clear. Whereas the principal political
actors may have shared a common interest in the jurisdictional mutation, it was,
like still water, slowly but deeply boring a creek in the most important founda-
tion of the constitutional order, the understanding between the European Court
and its national counterparts about the material limits to Community jurisdic-
tion. The erosion of enumeration meant that the new legal order, and the
judicial-legal contract which underwrote it, was to extend to all areas of
128. As mentioned earlier, institutional and organic changes would in principle require Treaty
amendment, though Usher, supra note 114, gives examples of institutional changes ex 235.
129. See Lachmann, supra note 121 (detailing strong Danish principled opposition to wide use of
Article 235).
130. Van Gend & Loos, supra note 42.
131. Frontini v. Amministrazione Delle Finanze, 1974 Common Mkt. L.R. 372,385 (emphasis added).
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activity-a change for which the Member State legal orders might not have
bargained. With the addition of the SEA, what was an underground creek will
become one of the more transparent points of pressure of the system.
There is another, obvious sense in which erosion of enumeration is prob-
lematic from a constitutional perspective. The general assumption that unanimi-
ty sufficiently guarantees the Member States against abusive expansion is
patently erroneous. First, it is built on the false assumption that conflates the
government of a state with the state. Constitutional guarantees are designed,
in part, to defend against the political wishes of this or that government, which
government after all, in a democratic society, is contingent in time and often
of limited representativeness. Additionally, even where there is wall-to-wall
political support, there will not necessarily be a recognition that constitutional
guarantees are intended to protect, in part, individuals against majorities, even
big ones. It is quite understandable why, for example, political powers might
have a stake in expansion. One of the rationales, trite yet no less persuasive,
of enumeration and divided powers is to anticipate that stake to prevent concen-
tration of power in one body and at one level. When that body and that level
operate in an environment of reduced public accountability (as is the case of
the Commission and the Council in the Community environment) the impor-
tance of the constitutional guarantee even increases.
2. Mutation and the Question of the Democratic Character of the Expan-
sion
Treaty amendment by Article 236 satisfies the constitutional requirement
all Member States have that calls for assent of national parliaments. The
expansive usage of Article 235 evades that type of control. At a very formal
level, the jurisdictional mutation of the nature that occurred in the 1970's
accentuates the problems of democratic accountability of the Community. This
deficit is not made up by the nonbinding consultation of the European Parlia-
ment in the context of 235.
The "democratic" danger of unchecked expansion is not, however, in the
formal lack of Member State parliamentary ratification: the structure of Europe-
an democracies is such that it is idle to think that governments could not ram
most expansive measures down willing or unwilling parliamentary throats. After
all, in most European parliamentary democracies, governments enjoy a majority
in their national parliaments and members of parliaments tend to be fairly
compliant in following the policies of the party masters in government. The
danger of expansion rests in a more realistic view of European democracies.
The major substantive areas in which expansion took place were social:
consumer protection, environmental protection, and education, for example.
These are typically areas of diffuse and fragmented interests. Whether we adopt
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a traditional democratic or a neo-corporatist model, 32 we cannot fail to note
that the elaboration of the details of such legislation in the Community context
had the effect of squeezing out interest groups representing varying social
interests, which had been integrated to one degree or another into national
policymaking processes. 3 3 The Community decisionmaking process, with its
lack of transparency and tendency to channel many issues into "state interests,"
tends to favor certain groups well-placed to play the Community-Member State
game and disfavor others-especially those that depend on a parliamentary
chamber and the "principle of re-election" to vindicate diffuse and fragmented
interests.
Expansion thus did not simply underscore the perennial democracy deficit
of the Community, but actually distorted the balance of social and political
forces in the decisional game at both the Member State and Community level.
E. Conclusion
The principal feature of the period lasting from the mid-1970's into the
1980's is that precisely in this period, one of political stagnation and decisional
malaise, another important, if less visible, constitutional mutation-the erosion
of the limits to Community competences-took place. The full importance of
this mutation and some of its inherent dangers and risks come to light only
now, in the 1992 epoch. And yet a final word is called for. Unlike the constitu-
tional revolution in the Foundational Period, which seems irreversible and
which constitutes the very foundation of the Community, the mutation of the
1970's can perhaps be checked. I shall return to this theme below.
III. 1992 AND BEYOND
A. Introduction
The 1992 program and the Single European Act (SEA) determine both the
current agenda of the Community and its modus operandi." Neither instru-
132. Parliament is only one of the actors in the outplay of democratic choices. Cf. P. SCHMITIER,
DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND NEO-CORPORATIST PRACTICE (Eur. U. Inst. Working Papers, No. 83/74).
133. On the ambivalent position of pressure groups at the E.C. level, see, e.g., Loosli-Surrans, Quelle
S~curit6 pour les Consommateurs Europiens?; Micklitz, Considerations Shaping Future Consumer Participa-
lion in European Product Safety Law in C. JOERGES, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND PRODUCT SAFETY IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMIUNITY (Eur. U. Inst. Working Papers, No. 89/404). See generally A. PrLIP, PRESSURE
GROUPS INTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (U. Ass'n for Contemp. Eur. Stud. Occasional Papers, No. 2, 1985).
134. See generally J. DERUYT, L'ACTE UNIQUE EURoPgEN (1989); 1992: ONE EUROPEAN MARKET
(1988); Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the Community?, 27 CoLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 529 (1989); Dehousse, 1992 attd Beyond: The Institutional Dimension of the Internal Market
Programme, 1 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 109 (1989); Ehlermann, The Internal Market Following
the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 361 (1987) [hereinafter Internal Market]; Ehlermann,
"1992 Project," supra note 13; Glaesner, The Single European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 446 (1987); Glaesner, The Single European Act, 6 Y.B. EUR. L. 283 (1986); Glaesner, L'Article
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ment is on its face functionally radical; the White Paper 35 goal of achieving
a single market merely restates, with some nuances, the classical (Treaty of
Rome) objective of establishing a common market. The bulk of the 1992
program is little more than a legislative timetable for achieving in seven years
what the Community should have accomplished in the preceding thirty. The
SEA is even less powerful. 36 Its forays into environmental policy and the
like fail to break new jurisdictional ground, and its majority voting provisions,
designed to harmonize non-tariff barriers to trade, seem to utilize such restric-
tive language, and open such glaring new loopholes, 137 that even some of the
most authoritative commentators believed the innovations caused more harm
than good in the Community. 38 Clearly, the European Parliament and the
Commission were far from thrilled with the new act.
139
100 A: Un Nouvel Instrument Pour la Realisation du Marche Commun, 25 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPIFN
615 (1989); Moravcsik, Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional statecraft
in the European Community, 45 INT'L ORGANIZATION 19 (1991).
135. COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET (Milan, June 28-29, 1985), Corn (85) 310 (White Paper
from the Commission to the European Council). In this White Paper the Commission outlined its internal
market strategy, later to be called the 1992 program.
136. "Measured against Parliament's Draft Treaty of European Union and other recent reform proposals,
as well as against the stated preferences of the Commission and certain Member States, the Single European
Act is not a revolutionary product." Bermann, supra note 134, at 586.
137. See, e.g., SEA, art. 100a(4) (supplementing the EEC Treaty, art. 100).
138. See, e.g., Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 9 (1987) (describing SEA as a "severe setback" for the European Community); see also Pescatore,
Die "Einheitliche Europdische Acte," Eine ernste Gefahrflir den Gemeinsamen Markt, 21 EUROPARECHT
153 (1986).
139. See Address by Commission Vice President Frans Andriessen, Signing Ceremony for SEA (1986)
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES (2-1986) point 1.1.1. (giving SEA decidedly cool reception); see also Address
by Jacques Delors, Programme of the Commission for 1986, reprinted in BULL. EUR. COMiUNITIES (Supp.
1/86). Delors gave the Act a cool reception but put on a brave face: "You [Parliament] have your reserva-
tions, we have ours; but it would be a mistake io be overly pessimistic." (emphasis added).
Ehlermann in his 1987 paper comments that "[c]omparing the final text of the Single European Act
with the Commission's original ideas shows that the differences are greatest in the area of the internal
market. Nowhere does the end result depart so radically from the Commission's original paper." Ehlermann,
The Internal Market, supra note 134, at 362. This is revealing since it suggests that at its core, the internal
market, the SEA seemed at first disappointing. Ehlermann's comments are particularly authoritative since
he was Director General of the Commission's Legal Service and privy to most developments from the inside.
His assessments also reflect the Commission's moods.
See Parliament Fights On For More Say, Eur. Parliament News, Jan. 1986, at 1, col. I (UK ed.) (report
on Parliament's negative reaction to outcome of intergovernmental conference).
See the following debates of the European Parliament: Resolution following the debate on the statement
by the Council and the Commission after the meeting of the European Council on Dec. 2-3, 1985, in
Luxembourg, 1985 O.1. (C 352) 60; Resolution on the position of the European Parliament on the Single
Act approved by the Intergovernmental Conference on Dec. 16-17, 1985, 1986 OJ. (C 36) 144; Resolution
on European Union and the Single Act, 1986 O.J. (C 120) 96; Resolution on relations between the European
Parliament and the Council, 1986 O.J. (C 283) 36; Resolution on relations between the European Parliament
and the Commission in the Institutional Context of the Treaties, 1986 O.J. (C 283) 39; Resolution on the
ratification procedure for the Single Act in national parliaments and on the attainment of European Union,
1986 O.J. (C 29) 119; Resolution on the Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (C 7) 105; Resolution on the
strategy of the European Parliament for achieving European Union, 1987 O.J. (C 190) 71; Resolution on
the results obtained from implementation of the Triple Act, 1988 O.J. (C 309) 93; Resolution on relations
between parliaments and the European Parliament, 1989 O.J. (C 69) 149.
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And yet, with the hindsight of just three years, it has become clear that
1992 and the SEA do constitute an eruption of significant proportions.10
Some of the evidence is very transparent. First, for the first time since the
very early years of the Community, if ever, the Commission plays the political
role clearly intended for it by the Treaty of Rome. In stark contrast to its nature
during the Foundational Period and the 1970's and early 1980's, the Commis-
sion in large measure both sets the Community agenda and acts as a power
broker in the legislative process.
141
Second, the decisionmaking process takes much less time. Dossiers that
would have languished and in some cases did languish in impotence for years
in the Brussels corridors now emerge as legislation often in a matter of
months.
42
For the first time, the interdependence of the policy areas at the new-found
focal point of power in Brussels creates a dynamic resembling the almost
forgotten predictions of neo-functionalist spillover 43 The ever-widening
scope of the legislative and policy agenda of the Community manifests this
dynamic. The agreement to convene two new intergovernmental conferences
to deal with economic and monetary union just three years after the adoption
of the SEA symbolizes the ever-widening scope of the agenda, as does the
increased perception of the Community and its institutions as a necessary,
legitimate, and at times effective locus for direct constituency appeal.
But if the instruments themselves (especially the SEA) are so meager, how
can one explain the changes they have wrought?
In the remainder of the Article I shall do the following: First, I shall take
a closer look at the impact of the SEA on the elements of Community structure
and process analyzed in the preceding sections of this Article. I shall try to
show that the changes are greater than meet the eye. I believe that their signifi-
cance, analyzed in the light of the transformation effected in the previous two
140. Again Ehlermann can serve as our barometer. Writing in 1990 he comments: "The '1992 Project'
has radically changed the European Community. It has given the 'common market' new impetus and has
lifted the Community out of the deep crisis in which it was bogged down in the first half of the 1980's."
He adds, "[the] Single European Act ... represents the most comprehensive and most important amendment
to the EEC Treaty to date .... [T]he core and the 'raison d'6tre' of the [SEA] are the provisions on the
internal market." Ehlermann, "1992 Project," supra note 13, at 1097, 1103. This change in nuance in
assessing the SEA reflects a general shift in opinion in European Institutions. My own assessment has been
that the dynamics generated by the SEA and 1992 surprised most observers and actors.
141. This development is the expected result of "returning" to majority voting. Amendments to
Commission proposals must be unanimous. EEC Treaty, art. 149 (1). But, the Commission "may alter its
proposal at any time during the procedures [of decisionmaking]." EEC Treaty, art. 149 (3). The Commission
may amend its own proposal, finding a via media among contrasting amendments. None of the amendments
on its own could gain unanimity, but a compromise version, in the form of a Commission's altered proposal,
may gain a majority. This prerogative of the Commission obviously gives it considerable power it did not
have under the shadow of the veto.
142. See Ehlermann, "1992 Project," supra note 13, at 1104-06.
143. Cf. Keohane & Hoffmann, Conclusions: community politics and institutional change, in THE
DYNAmICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 276, 282ff (W. Wallace ed. 1990). For a review of neo-functionalist
spillover, see Greilsammer, supra note 1.
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periods in the Community evolution, is far-reaching. Then, instead of elaborat-
ing further on the promise inherent in this last period in Community evolution,
a subject on which there has been no shortage of comment and celebration, I
shall attempt to point out dangers and raise critical questions.
B. Structural Background to 1992 and the Single European Act-The Tension
and its Resolution
The balance of constitutionalism and institutionalism, of reduced Exit and
enhanced Voice, was the heritage of the Foundational Period and explains much
of the subsequent strength and stability of the Community polity.'" But the
Foundational Period equilibrium was not without its costs. Those costs are the
ones inherent in consensus politics: the need to reach unanimous agreement in
policymaking and governance.
From the little empirical evidence available, we know that consensus politics
did not significantly impede policy management during the 1960's, 1970's, and
into the 1980's."'I However, the Community became increasingly unable to
respond to new challenges, that called for real policy choices. Thus, while
consensus politics (the manifestation of enhanced Voice) explains the relative
equanimity with which the jurisdictional limits of the Community broke down
in the 1970's, this very consensus model also explains why, within the
Community's expanded jurisdiction, it was unable to realize its most traditional
and fundamental objectives, such as establishing a single market in the four
factors of production.146 From a structural point of view, one critical impedi-
ment to these goals was the growth in the number of Member States. In just
over a decade the number of Member States doubled. But the new Member
States entered a Community with decisional processes that were created in the
Foundational Period and that were not changed to accommodate the increased
number of participants. Achieving consensus among the original six was
difficult enough. It became substantially more difficult with the first enlarge-
ment to nine and virtually debilitating when the number grew to twelve. In
addition, the entry first of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark and then of Greece,
Spain, and Portugal caused the Community to lose a certain homogeneity of
policy perception and cultural orientation. This loss of homogeneity accentuated
a problem that would exist in any event by the pure numbers game. Community
decisionmaking fell into deep malaise. It is not surprising that almost every
144. See supra Sections I.I-E.
145. See Krislov, Ehlermann & Weiler, supra note 1, at 30-57.
146. For an analysis of the fragmented market despite close to three decades of a common market
regime, see J. PELKMANS & A. WINTERS, EUROPE'S DOMESTIC MARKET (1988).
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initiative between 1980 and the SEA recognized the need to change processes
of decisionmaking, usually by moving to some form of majority voting.1
47
Another structural element encouraged change. The evolving rules concern-
ing the free movement of goods and other factors of production between the
Member States created a regulatory gap in the European polity. A rigorous (and
courageous t48) jurisprudence of the Court of Justice seriously limited the
ability of the Member States to adopt protectionist measures via-a-vis each
other.149 Indeed, it went further. The Court held that once the Community
enacted measures regulating nontariff barriers to movement of goods, such
measures would preempt any subsequently enacted Member State legislation
that frustrated the design of the extant Community measures. 150 In addition,
it is important to remember that this was an area in which the Treaty provided
for unanimous decisionmaking. The Treaty rule on decisionmaking and the
Court's jurisprudence on the preemptive effect of such decisionmaking com-
bined to chill the climate in which the Community and its Member States were
to make critical decisions to eliminate the numerous barriers to a true common
market. Not only was it difficult to achieve consensus on one Community norm
to replace the variety of Member State norms, but also there was the growing
fear that once such a norm was adopted, it would lock all Member States into
a discipline from which they could not exit without again reaching unanimity.
If the Community once agreed on a norm on, for example, the permissible level
of lead in gasoline, no Member State could subsequently reduce the level
further without the consent of all twelve Member States within the Community
decisionmaking process. The combination of legal structure and political process
militated against easy consensus even on nonprotectionist policy.
The deep political subtlety of the Commission white paper outlining the
1992 program becomes clear in this context, as does its ultimate success. Unlike
all earlier attempts and proposals to revive the Community, the 1992 White
Paper, although innovative in its conception of achieving a Europe without
frontiers, t51 was entirely functional. It delineated the ostensibly uncontrover-
sial goal of realizing an internal market, and, in the form of a technical list of
of required legislation, the uncontroversial means necessary to achieve that goal.
147. See J. DERUYT, supra note 134, at 25- 65 (analysis of previous attempts to reinvigorate in the
1980's, including Genscher-Colombo initiative, Stuttgart Solemn Declaration, and Parliament 1984 Draft
Treaty, as well as work and conclusion of Dooge Committee which laid ground for SEA.)
148. Unlike those of most other systems in Europe, judges on the European Court serve for renewable
terms (Article 167 EEC). This rule compromises the appearance of independence. Currently the intergov-
ernmental conference holds a proposal to extend the terms of judges to 12 years and make them non-
renewable. See Resolution of European Parliament on the Intergovernmental Conference PE 146.824, art.
167.
149. The famous line of decision from Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit and Gustave Dassonville,
1974 E.C.R. 837 and its progeny. See generally L. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN
THE EEC (1985).
150. See, e.g., Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629, 1643 (Recital 27); Case
5/77, Tedeschi v. Denkavit Commerciale, 1977 E.C.R. 1555, 1576-77 (Recital 35) [hereinafter Denkavit].
151. Ehlermann, "1992 Project." supra note 13, at 1099.
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Critically, it eschewed any grandiose institutional schemes. These were to come
as an inevitable result, once 1992 was in place. Because of this technocratic
approach, the White Paper apparently appealed to those with different, and
often opposing, ideological conceptions of the future of Europe. To some, it
represented the realization of the old dream of a true common marketplace,
which, because of the inevitable connection between the social and the econo-
mic in modern political economies, would ultimately yield the much vaunted
"ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." To others, it offered a vision
of the European dream finally lashed down to the marketplace, and, important-
ly, a market unencumbered by the excessive regulation that had built up in the
individual Member States. Dismantling regulation that impeded intra-Commu-
nity trade would, on this reading, yield the dismantling of regulation altogether.
The key to the success of the 1992 strategy occurred when the Member
States themselves agreed to majority voting. They took this step clearly not as
a dramatic political step toward a higher level of European integration in the
abstract, but rather as a low-key technical necessity in realizing the "non-
controversial" objectives of the White Paper. This movement found expression
in the single most important provision of the SEA, Article 100a.
As indicated above, this provision at face value seems minimalist and even
destructive. First, the move to majority voting in Article 100a is couched as
a residual measure and derogation from the principal measure, which requires
unanimity, namely old Article 100.152 Second, the exception to Article 100a,
Article 100a(4), was drafted in an even more restrictive form by the heads of
state and government themselves.153 The exception states that for enactments
by majority voting a Member State may, despite the existence of a Community
norm, adopt national safeguard measures. 154 Indeed, this exception may be
seen as an ingenious attempt by the Member States to retain the equilibrium
of the Foundational Period in the new context of majority voting.
The essence of the original equilibrium rested on the acceptance by the
Member States of a comprehensive Community discipline on the condition that
each would have a determinative Voice, the veto, in the establishment of new
norms. In Article 100a, the Member States, by accepting a passage to majority
voting, seemed to be destroying one of the two pillars of the foundational
equilibrium. But, by allowing a Member State to derogate from a measure even
152. See Article 100a (1) ("By way of derogation from Article 100 .....
153. See Ehlermann, Internal Market, supra note 134, at 381.
154. Article 100a (4):
If, after the adoption of a harmonization measure by the Council acting by a qualified majority,
a Member State deems it necessary to apply national provisions on grounds of major needs
referred to in Article 36... it shall notify the Commission of these provisions. The Commission
shall confirm the provisions involved after having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. By way of derogation
from the procedure laid down in Articles 169 and 170, the Commission or any Member State may
bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State is
making improper use of the powers provided for in this Article.
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in the face of a Community norm (adopted by a majority!) the other pillar of
comprehensive Community jurisdiction seems to be equally eroded, thereby
restoring the equilibrium. The exception breaks, of course, the rule of pre-
emption established by the Court in cases where harmonization measures were
adopted."' 5
Finally, as an indication of the low-key attitude toward the new voting
procedure, a proposal to formally "repeal" the Luxembourg Accord was
rejected by the Member States. Indeed, when presenting the SEA to their
national parliaments, both the French and British ministers for foreign affairs
claimed that the Single European Act left the Luxembourg Accord intact. Thus
the French Foreign Minister solemnly declared in the Assemblie Nationale, re-
sponding to concerns that the SEA gave too much power to the Community
at the expense of the Member States, that "en toute hypothese, mime dans les
domaines oft s'applique la regle de la majoriti qualifige, l'arrangement de
Luxembourg de janvier 1966 demeure et conserve toute sa valeur." Likewise,
in the House of Commons the British Foreign Secretary assured the House that
"as a last resort, the Luxembourg compromise remains in place untouched and
unaffected."'
56
These three elements together may have given the Member States the
feeling that the step they took was of limited significance and the outside
observer the impression that the basic equilibrium was not shattered. It is most
striking in this connection to note that even Mrs. Thatcher, the most diffident
Head of Government among the large Member States, characterized the Single
European Act on the morrow of its adoption by the European Council as a
"modest step forward."' 57 But shattered it was, since each of these precau-
tions was either ill-conceived or rendered impracticable because of open-
textured drafting and a teleology that traditionally presaged for construing
derogations to the Treaty in the narrowest possible way.
Although the language of the provision suggests the new system was
intended as a derogation, the prevailing view is that Article 100a has become
the "default" procedure for most internal market legislation, and that the
procedure of other articles is an exception. 158 Significantly, the connection
155. See Denkavit, supra note 150.
156. On the failure of the proposal to repeal the Accord, see Ehlermann, "1992 Project," supra note
13, at 1106. For declarations in the British Parliament and the French Parliament on the continued existence
of the Luxembourg Accord even after the SEA, see 96 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 320 (1986) (Debates
of the House of Commons of April 23, 1986); Sdance of the Assemblee Nationale (Nov. 20, 1986), J.O.
No. 109 [lI A.N. (C.R.), 8th Ldgislature, 81st S6ance 6611 (Nov. 21, 1986).
157. Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1985, at A29, col. 1.
158. "Article 100a thus gives the Council enormous scope for action, which is limited principally, I
suspect, only by the existence of other enabling provisions," Ehlermann, Internal Market, supra note 134,
at 384. Ehlermann argues convincingly that Article 100a will be used in most cases, even in amending old
Article 100 legislation, a case in which Article 235's provision for unanimity may have been used in the
past. He says it will be used also for legislation of a scope that goes beyond the grounds of Article 100,
which was limited to harmonization of national measures that affected the establishment or functioning of
the common market. Thus, Article 100a will be used, in most cases, when new legislation to achieve the
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between Article 100a and Article 8a means that majority voting should take
place, except where specifically excluded,'59 for all measures needed to
achieve the objective of an internal market. The internal market is defined as
"an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital is ensured."'160 This requirement of majority
voting extends the scope of Article 100a procedure beyond the harmonization
of technical standards affecting the free movement of goods. The net result is
that few cases exist that would compel resort to the old legal basis and its
unanimity requirement. The Commission proposes the legal basis of decisions;
any change of such basis would be subject itself to a unanimous Council vote,
which would be difficult to achieve. In any event, even if Council could change
the legal basis, the Court, if a challenge were brought, would tend to side with
the Commission on issues of legal basis. 6 '
Likewise, and contrary to some of the doomsday predictions, 62 the dero-
gation to the principle of preemption in Article 100a(4), so carefully crafted
by prime ministers and presidents, has had and must have very little impact.
It allows a Member State to adopt, under strict conditions and subject to judicial
review, unilateral derogation of Community harmonizing measures when the
Member State seeks to uphold a higher level of protection. But that does not
seem to be the real battlefield of majority voting. The real battlefield is regula-
tion by the Community in areas in which Member States may feel that they do
not want any regulation at all, let alone a higher Community standard.
63
The sharpest impact, however, of majority voting under the SEA does not
turn on these rather fine points. Earlier I explained that, although the language
of the Luxembourg Accord suggested its invocation only when asserting a vital
national interest, its significance rested in the fact that practically all decision-
making was conducted under the shadow of the veto and resulted in general
consensus politics. 6"
common market is needed. Id.
159. E.g., SEA, art. 100a(2).
160. SEA, art. 8a.
161. In a series of cases, starting with Case 45/86, Commission of the European Communities v.
Council of the European Communities, 1987 E.C.R. 1493 (GTP), the Commission has challenged the
Council's use of Article 235 (which provides for unanimity) rather than alternative legal bases in the Treaty.
In a clear departure from its precedent, which would have allowed the Council to do so, in Massey
Ferguson, supra note 120, the Court sided with the Commission. See also Case 51/87 Commission of E.C.
v. Council of E.C., 1988 E.C.R. 5459; Case 165/87, Commission of E.C. v. Council of E.C., 1988 E.C.R.
5545; Case 275/87, Commission of E.C. v. Council of E.C., 1989 E.C.R. 259; Case 288/87. But see Case
242/87, Commission of E.C. v. Council of E.C., 1989 E.C.R. 1425.
162. See, e.g., Pescatore, supra note 138.
163. Britain strongly opposed, on principle, the adoption of Council Directive No. 89/662 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the
labelling of tobacco products, 1989 O.J. (L 359). It did not oppose the low standard of the regulation but
argued that the Commuity did not have competence in the field of health. The derogation in Article 100a(4)
was useless in the face of this type of opposition. Britain had recourse only if it wanted a higher standard
of protection against the danger of smoking.
164. The only habitual prior exception concerned decisions within the process of adopting the
Community budget.
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Likewise, the significance of Article 100a was its impact on all Community
decisionmaking. Probably the most significant text is not the SEA, but the
consequently changed rules of procedure of the Council of Ministers, which
explain the rather simple mechanism for going to a majority vote.16 Thus,
Article 100a's impact is that practically all Community decisionmaking is
conducted under the shadow of the vote (where the Treaty provides for such
vote). The Luxembourg Accord, if not eliminated completely, has been rather
restricted. For example, it could not be used in the areas in which Article 100a
provides the legal basis for measures. In addition, to judge from the assiduous-
ness with which the Member States argue about legal bases, which determine
whether a measure is adopted by majority or unanimity, 66 it is rather clear
that they do not feel free to invoke the Luxembourg Accord at whim. If the
Accord persists at all, it depends on the assertion of a truly vital national
interest, accepted as such by the other Member States, and the possibility of
any Member State forcing a vote on the issue under the new rules of procedure.
In other words, in accordance with the new rules, to invoke the Luxembourg
Accord a Member State must persuade at least half the Member States of the
"vitality" of the national interest claimed.
C. Under the Shadow of the Vote I
Majority voting thus becomes a central feature of the Community in many
of its activities. 67 A parallel with the opposite (Luxembourg Accord veto)
practice of the past exists: today, an actual vote by the majority remains the
exception. Most decisions are reached by consensus. But reaching consensus
under the shadow of the vote is altogether different from reaching it under the
shadow of the veto. The possibility of breaking deadlocks by voting drives the
negotiators to break the deadlock without actually resorting to the vote. And,
as noted above, the power of the Commission as an intermediary among the
negotiating members of Council has been considerably strengthened.
This Article has emphasized the relationships between the transformations
of each of the definitional periods of the Community. In discussing each of the
earlier periods, I have already pointed out the evolution of some important
165. See amendment of the Council's Rules of Procedure adopted by the Council on July 20, 1987,
1987 OJ. (L 291) 27. New Article 5 provides:
1. The Council shall vote on the initiative of its President. The President shall, furthermore, be
required to open voting proceedings on the invitation of a member of the Council or of the
Commission, provided that a majority of the Council's members so decides.
The new rules do not differentiate between votes ex Article 1 00a and any other legal basis which provides
for majority voting in the Treaty.
166. See Article 235 cases, supra note 161.
167. Several important Community areas remain that require unanimity. Article 100a(2) provides for
exceptions from majority voting in the field of movement of persons, fiscal provisions, and rights and
interests of employed persons.
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structural elements, such as the growth in the number of the Member States,
that partially caused this "return" to majority voting.
But, of course, the crucial linkage to the past is not cause but effect. The
"(re)turn" to majority voting constitutes a transformation as momentous as those
that occurred earlier in the life of the Community because of those earlier
changes. It is trite but worth repeating, that absent the earlier process of
constitutionalization, a process that gave a real "bite" to Community norms,
adoption by majority would be of far lesser significance. What puts the Com-
munity and its Member States in a new "defining" situation is the fact that the
Foundational equilibrium, despite attempts to rescue it in the actual drafting of
the SEA, seems to be shattered.'68 Unlike any earlier era in the Communi-
ty,69 and unlike most of their other international and transnational experience,
Member States are now in a situation of facing binding norms, adopted wholly
or partially against their will, with direct effect in their national legal orders.
Likewise, the erosion of enumeration is far more significant in the environ-
ment of majority voting. There is something almost pitiful in the rude awaken-
ing of some of the Member States. For example, in 1989, the Council, in a
hotly contested majority vote on the basis of Article 100a, adopted the new
Community cigarette labelling directive, which specifies a menu of mandatory
warnings. Manufacturers must choose a warning to print on all cigarette
packets. 7 ' The directive was hotly contested not because of the content of
the warnings or even the principle of warnings, but because one of the Member
States challenged the competence of the Council (meeting as a Council of
Health Ministers) to adopt legislation pursuing the objective of health. Strictly
speaking, to achieve a common market in tobacco products, it would be enough
to pass a measure providing that cigarette packages carrying any of the warn-
ings agreed upon could not be impeded in its intra-Community free movement.
168. If the Member States did not want to be in this situation, why did they, in practice, construe the
SEA as they did? One can only speculate as to the answer: Critically, Member States differ in relation to
the turn to majority voting. Some feel that the reality of interdependence is such that a blocking possibility
pays less than the ability to force a recalcitrant major player in certain circumstances. In addition, it seems
that, as in earlier episodes, some simply did not appreciate the significance of their constitutionalizing moves
and unwittingly found themselves in the "trap" of Community discipline, where the stakes of rupture are
possibly very high. It always seems difficult to root an explanation in ignorance by, or mistake of, major
state actors. But how else does one explain the statements made by the British and French Foreign Ministers
in their respective parliamentary assemblies? See supra note 156. Or how does one explain Thatcher's early
evaluation of the SEA as a "modest" step-a step which later has come to be regarded as the "most
comprehensive and most important amendment to the EEC Treaty to date . .. "? Was she deliberately
underestimating the nature of change brought about by, in particular, the shift to majority voting, or was
she, as I argue in the text, not fully aware of the limits to the safeguards built into the revised Article 100a?
Failure of Member States to appreciate the full impact of their action is not new. As indicated above, it
would appear that in negotiating Article 177 the Member States were not fully aware of its far-reaching
constitutional implications. See supra text accompanying note 39.
169. There were a few episodes in which the Luxembourg Accord did not "save" a Member State.
The Agricultural Price increase episode in 1982 is an example. See The (London) Times, May 19, 1982
at 1, 5, 30 (articles on EEC override of British veto); A Failure for Europe, id. at 15; see also Editorial
Comments: The Vote on the Agricultural Prices: A New Departure?, 19 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 371 (1982).
170. See Cigarette Labelling Directive, supra note 163.
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This directive goes much further, however. Instead of stopping at the Market
rationale, its legal basis includes the European Council meeting of June 1985,
which launched a European action program against cancer and the Resolution
of July 1986 on a program of action of the European Communities against can-
cer.
171
What, in June 1985 (prior to the SEA), may have seemed a totally banal
resolution under which Member States could control any operationalization of
the action program against cancer, attained an altogether different meaning in
1989, when the measures could be, and were, adopted by majority vote. How-
ever, in the light of the erosion of the principle of enumeration in the 1970's,
a challenge to the constitutionality of the measure as ultra vires would likely
fail.
Member States thus face not only the constitutional normativity of measures
adopted often wholly or partially against their will, but also the operation of
this normativity in a vast area of public policy, 172 unless the jurisprudence
changes or new constitutional amendments are introduced.
173
171. 1986 O.J. (C 184) 19.
172. Admittedly, legislating on the outer reaches of Community jurisdiction requires resorting to Article
235, which does provide for unanimity. But, as discussed supra at text following note 158, Article 100a
could be used in some instances instead of 235, especially given the new Commission strategy, supported
by the Court, of limiting the use of 235 whenever another Treaty legal basis exists; the cigarette labelling
directive illustrates this point quite forcefully.
173. In fact, in this new decisional climate a heightened sensitivity to demarcation of competences
exists, one which hardly existed in the past. See Resolution of Parliament of July 12, 1990, on the principle
of Subsidiarity, (PE 143.504):
[H]aving regard to the future development of the Community, in particular its commitment to draw
up a draft constitution for European Union and the fact this process of transforming the European
Community requires a clear distinction to be made between the competences of the union and
those of the member States...
Preamble to Resolution, at 13 (emphasis added); see also 27th Report of the Select Committee on the
European Communities [of the British House of Lords] on Economic and Monetary Union and Political
Union of October 30, 1990 (HL Paper 88-I) at 143-44, 204 ("There is also a more general fear that the
Community is taking collective decisions in areas where such choices could perfectly well be left to the
member States.")[hereinafter Select Comm.]. See generally Jacqu6 & Weiler, On the Road to European
Union-A New Judical Architecture: An Agenda for the Intergovernmental Conference, 27 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 185, 199-206 (1990); Editorial Comments, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 181 (1990).
For a recent harsh critique of the unchecked expansion of jurisdiction, see Hailbronner, Legal-
Institutional Reforms of the EC: What can we learn from Federalism Theory and Practice, EC 92 AND
BEYOND: NEW POLITICAL STRuCTuREs AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (E.
Petersman ed. forthcoming).
In the recently leaked "Non-Paper" of the Luxembourg Presidency of April 15, 1991, setting out the
state of negotiation of the Intergovernmental Conference, the Principle of Subsidiarity has been inserted
as an operational part of the Treaty. The proposal is included as an amendment to EEC Treaty, art. 3 and
reads as follows:
La Communaut6 agit dans les limites des comp6tences qui lui sont confdr~es et des objectifs qui
lui sont assign~s par le present trait6. Dans les domaines que ne reldvent pas de sa competence
exclusive, la Communaut6 intervient conform~ment au principe de la subsidiarit6, si et dans la
mesure o4 les objectifs qui lui sont assignes peuvent etre mieux rdalis~s au niveau communautaire
qu'au niveau des Etats membres oeuvrant isol6ment, en raison des dimensions ou des effets de
l'action envisag~e.
Non-Paper: Project D'Articles De Traite, En Vue De La Mise En Place D'Une Union Politique 12
(Luxembourg, April 15, 1991).
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D. Under the Shadow of the Vote II: Question Marks
As indicated above, I think enough has been written about the promise of
the enhanced "efficiency" of the decisional process and the internal dynamic
generated and manifested, for example, in the current intergovernmental confer-
ences.1
74
In contrast, I wish to explore less visible implications of the change. Since
the SEA does rupture a fundamental feature of the Community in its Founda-
tional Period, the equilibrium between constitutional and institutional power,
it would follow from the analysis of the Foundational Period that the change
should have implications that go beyond simple legislative efficiency. On this
reading, the SEA regime does truly constitute a defining experience for the
Community. The lack of any temporal perspective suggests great caution in this
part of the analysis, and I pose my points as questions and challenges rather
than affirmations.
1. The Challenge of Compliance 75
Although the problem of compliance with Community norms by the Mem-
ber States is not new, the context of the SEA regime changes our evaluation.
In reading the explanation earlier that the Community has developed
effective mechanisms for the enforcement of Community law, one should not
be misled to think that no violations, by Member States, Community institu-
tions, or individuals, occur. They occur regularly and, as Community activities
and impact expand, increasingly. T17  In this respect the Community is no dif-
ferent (in principle) than, for example, any state of equivalent size and com-
plexity. Indeed, that was the critical factor in our analysis. When violation takes
place it does so in a constitutional context with an ethos of domestic rather than
international law. Since the Member States were able to control the elaboration
of Community legislation in all its phases and were able to block any measure
not to their liking, the noncompliance reflex would tend to operate at a surface
and convenience level and thus would not indicate fundamental discontent. 177
If this proposal survives the Conference and is ultimately adopted it would, on my reading, provide
a new criterion for judicial review by the Court ex Articles 173 and 177(b). The fact that subsidiarity, often
thought of as a principle incapable of translation into an operative positive obligation, has been included,
is an indication of the strength of feeling concerning the question of erosion of jurisdictional limits.
174. For the "bright side of the moon" see Ehlermann, "1992 Project," supra note 13.
175. See generally Weiler, The White Paper and the Application of Community Law, in 1992: ONE
EUROPEAN MARKET? 337 (1988).
176. The White Paper raises the issue explicitly in § 152.
177. The Commission drew a bleak picture in the white Paper:
Of the total number of complaints received by the Commission, some 60%, i.e. on average 255 each
year, relate to Articles 30-36 of the Treaty, but because of the lack of resources it can, in a given year,
settle only one hundred cases. The resulting delays and backlogs benefit the infringing States, impede
systematic action, proceedings, and frustrate the confidence of industry as well as that of the man in
the street. Measures have to be taken to remedy the situation.
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Under the new regime noncompliance could become more of a strategy. If
the equilibrium of Voice and Exit is shattered by reducing the individual power
of Member State Voice, the pressure might force a shift to strategies of Exit,
which, in the Community context means selective application rather than
withdrawal. There are some signs that this may be happening."' In any event,
although the Community is impressively on course in "implementing" the 1992
legislative program, a "black hole" of knowledge exists regarding the true level
of Member State implementation.1
79
This problem of compliance is merely one manifestation of the deep
dilemma involved in dismantling the Foundational equilibrium. It is useful here,
albeit in a very loose manner, to introduce Hirschman's third notion, Loyalty.
Two possible readings of the future present themselves. On one reading, the
dismantling of the Foundational equilibrium will constitute a destabilizing act
of such dimension that it threatens the acceptance not simply of a particular
Community measure but of the very constitutional foundation. Alternatively,
acceptance of Community discipline may have become the constitutional reflex
of the Member States and their organs. 8° A Loyalty to the institution may
have developed that breaks out of the need for constant equilibrium. The two
decades of enhanced Voice thus constitute a learning and adaptation process
Id. at § 153. One should not minimize the pragmatic nature of the problem, accentuated by the ability of
Member States to disregard judgments of the Court in direct Article 169 actions. Nonetheless, it is interesting
to note that the protectionist violation the Commission points out has been in some measure at least a
response to the jurisprudence of the Court and not to consensual legislation. As far as directives are
concerned, in most cases, nonincorporation is a result of objective constitutional and procedural difficulties
at the national level (especially in Italy and Belgium) and not from an evasive or defiant strategy by a
Member State.
178. The problem was considered sufficently grave to merit specific mention in the conclusions of the
Dublin Summit of June 25-26, 1990, which set up the new Intergovernmental Conferences. Thus, in Annex
I, mention was made of the need to give consideration to the automatic enforceability of Article 169 and
171 judgments of the European Court and of Member States ensuring the implementation and observance
of Community law and European Court judgments. Dublin Summit, Annex I, reprinted in Conclusions of
the European Council Dublin 25 & 26 June 1990, EUROPE Doc. (No. 1632/1633) 9 (June 29, 1990).
The European Parliament in its proposed Treaty Amendments submitted to the Intergovernmental
Conference suggested amending Article 171 to read:
The court may combine its judgments with financial sanctions against the Member State that has
been found to be in default. The amount and method of collection of such'sanctions shall be
determined by a regulation adopted by the Community in accordance with the procedure laid down
pursuant to Article 188(b). The Court may also impose on recalcitrant states other sanctions such
as suspension of right to participate in certain Community programmes, to enjoy certain advantag-
es or to have access to certain community funds.
art. 171, PE 146.824. The Select Committee of the House of Lords, in its Report on Economic and Monetary
Union and Political Union, observed: "[Tlhere are Member States which seem to treat their obligation to
translate Directives into national law by a certain date as little more than a vague guideline." Select Comm.,
supra note 173, at 1 146; see also id. 1 4548, 205.
179. On the general picture of implementation, see Septieme Rapport Annuel au Parlement Europeen
Sur Le Controle De L'Application Du Droit Communutaire, Com (90) 288 final (May 22, 1990). See also
Commission Reports on the Implementation of the White Paper.
180. For suggestions that this issue may be not quite as settled as one may wish, not even among the
courts of the Member States, see, e.g., Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional Court and the Relationship
between the Italian Legal System and the European Community, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 173 (1990); Szysz-
czak, Sovereignty: Crisis, Compliance. Confusion, Complacency?, 15 EUR. L. REv. 480 (1990).
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resulting in socialization; at the end of this period decisional changes affecting
Voice will not cause a corresponding adjustment to Exit. Time will tell, but
there are signs that Loyalty with a large mixture of expediency may prevent
or at least reduce the otherwise destabilizing effect of the new change.
2. Challenges of "Democracy" and "Legitimacy"
18 1
1992 also puts a new hue on the question of the Democracy Deficit. A
useful starting point could indeed be a focus on the European Parliament and
its role.
It is traditional to start an analysis of the role of the European Parliament
in the governance structure of the Community with a recapitulation of the
existing Democracy Deficit in E.C. decisionmaking. This deficit informs, ani-
mates, and mobilizes the drive to change the powers of the European Parlia-
ment. In addition, to the extent that the governments of the Member States have
responded, weakly and grudgingly, to this drive, it is surely because even they
recognized the compelling power of the Democracy Deficit argument.
The typical argument views the European Parliament as the only (or at least
principal) repository of legitimacy and democracy in the Community structure.
The phrase most often used in this context is "democratic legitimacy."'' 82 The
Commission, in this view, is an appointed body of international civil servants,
and the Council of Ministers represents the Executive branch of each national
government which, through Community structures, has legislative powers it
lacks on respective national scenes.
Thus, the Council, a collectivity of Ministers, on a proposal of the Commis-
sion, a collectivity of nonelected civil servants, could, and in some instances
must, pass legislation which is binding and enforceable even in the face of
conflicting legislation passed by national parliaments. This occurs without
corresponding parliamentary scrutiny and approval. Indeed, the Council could
pass the legislation in the face of the European Parliament's disapproval. This
happens often enough to render the point not simply theoretical. What is more,
the Council can legislate in some areas that were hitherto subject to parliamen-
tary control at the national level. We have already seen how the constitutionali-
zation process in the Foundational Period and the erosion of enumerated powers
in the second period accentuated this problem.
181. See Weiler, Parlement europ6en,. inugration europ~enne, d~mocratie et lkgidmitW, in LE
PARLEMENT EUROPEEN 325 (1988), in which I have elaborated these points more expansively. I have been
considerably helped by, and have drawn in particular on, the following works: L. BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING
INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989); T. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); J.
HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1975), L. HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS (1990); Dahl, Federalism and the Democratic Process, in LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, XXV NOMOs,
at 95 (1983). My own synoptic presentation cannot do justice to the richness of the works cited.
182. The problem of democratic structures is addressed this way by the Dublin Summit, Annex I, supra
note 178, at 8.
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According to this view of the Community, the powers of the European
Parliament are both weak and misdirected. They are weak in that the legislative
power (even post-SEA) is ultimately consultative in the face of a determined
Council. Even the Parliament's budgetary powers, though more concrete, do
not affect the crucial areas of budgetary policy: revenue raising and expenditure
on compulsory items. 83 The power to reject the budget in toto is a boomer-
ang which has not always proved effective, although in 1984 the budget
ultimately was amended in a direction that took account of some of Parlia-
ment's concerns. The possibility of denying a discharge on past expenditure
lacks any real sanction power.
Those parliamentary powers that are real, the powers to dismiss the Com-
mission, to ask questions of the Commission, and to receive answers, are
illusory at best and misdirected at worst. They are illusory because the power
to dismiss is collective and does not have the accompanying power to appoint.
They are misdirected because the Council is the "Villain of the Piece" in most
European Parliament battles.
All these well-known factors taken together constitute the elements of the
Democracy Deficit and create the crisis of legitimacy from which the Commu-
nity allegedly suffers.
Although the Democracy Deficit is prominent in Parliamentary rhetoric, the
day-to-day complaint of Parliament especially in the pre-SEA days was not that
the Community legislator (the Council) was over-vigorous and violated demo-
cratic principles, but rather that it failed to act vigorously enough. Critics
argued that the Council had incapacitated itself and the entire Community by
abandoning Treaty rules of majoritarian decisionmaking by giving a de facto
veto to each Member State govetnment that asserts a "vital national interest."
The veto power arrogated by the Member States produced another facet of
the Democracy Deficit: the ability of a small number of Community citizens
represented by their Minister in the Council to block the collective wishes of
the rest of the Community.
Parliamentarians almost uniformly claim that both facets of the malaise
could be corrected by certain institutional changes, which on the one hand
would "de-block" the Council by restoring majority voting, but which would
also significantly increase the legislative and control powers of Parliament.
Increased powers to the Parliament, directly elected by universal suffrage,
would, so it is claimed, substantially reduce the Democracy Deficit and restore
legitimacy to the Community decisionmaking process.
183. Parliament has a final say (within limits set by the Commission) only on expenditure items which
are not mandated by the Treaty itself. For the best explanation of Parliamentary powers in this field, see
J. JACQuIg, R. BIEBER, V. CONSTANTINESCO & D. NICKEL, LE PARLEMENT EUROP9aN 178 (1984). See also
Case 34/86, Council v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 2155 (Re: the 1986 Budget) (especially opinion of Advocate
General Mancini). Parliament was granted real approval control as regards Association Agreements ex Article
238 and accession of new Member States ex Article 237. It has no formal powers, even of consultation
as regards trade agreements ex Article 113.
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It is further argued that, regarding the decisional malaise, Parliament has
over the years boasted a Communautaire spirit which would, if given effective
outlet, transcend nationalistic squabbles and introduce a dynamism far more
consonant with the declared objectives of the Treaties. The large majority
accorded to the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union is cited as a
typical example of this dynamism. Although these points seem obvious, they
receive little critical analysis.
The absence of a critical approach derives in part from a loose usage of the
notions of democracy and legitimacy. Very frequently in discourse about
Parliament and the Community the concepts of democracy and legitimacy have
been presented interchangeably although in fact they do not necessarily coin-
.cide.
To be sure, today, a nondemocratic government or political system in the
West could not easily attain or maintain legitimacy, but it is still possible for
a democratic structure to be illegitimate-either in toto or in certain aspects of
its operation.'t
In spite of all the conceptual difficulties of dealing with "legitimacy,"' 85
even in this brief excursus it may be useful to draw one classical distinction
between formal (legal) legitimacy and social (empirical) legitimacy.
The notion of formal legitimacy in institutions or systems implies that all
requirements of the law are observed in the creation of the institution or system.
This concept is akin to the juridical concept of formal validity. In today's
Europe, as in the West generally, any notion of legitimacy must rest on some
democratic foundation, loosely stated as the People's consent to power struc-
tures and process. A Western institution or system satisfies formal legitimacy
if its power structure was created through democratic processes. 86 Thus, in
the Community context, I simply point out that the Treaties establishing the
Community, which gave such a limited role to the European Parliament, were
approved by the national parliaments of all founding Member States and
subsequently by the parliaments of six acceding Member States. Proposals to
give more power to the European Parliament have failed, for a variety of
reasons, to survive the democratic processes in the Member States. 87
184. A stark example may drive the point home better than an abstract explication: Germany during
the Weimar period was democratic but the government enjoyed little legitimacy. Germany during National
Socialism ceased to be democratic once Hitler rose to power, but the government continued to enjoy
widespread legitimacy well into the early 1940's. Cf. G. CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945, at chs. 15, 18 (1981).
185. See generally Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV.
379.
186. Franck's synthesis of "legitimacy" as it applies to the rules applicable to states is: "Legitimacy
is a property of a rule or rule making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those
addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and
operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process." T. FRANCK, supra note 181,
at 24 (emphasis in original).
187. The SEA, which touches only slightly the so-called Democracy Deficit, was ratified by the
parliaments of all the Member States. Likewise, with each Community enlargement, in 1973, 1981, and
1986, national parliaments had the opportunity to protest the nondemocratic character of the Community,
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This definition of formal legitimacy is thus distinct from that of simple
"legality." Formal legitimacy is legality understood in the sense that democratic
institutions and processes created the law on which it is based (in the Commu-
nity case the Treaties).
Thus, in this formal sense, the existing structure and process rests on a
formal approval by the democratically elected parliaments of the Member
States; and yet, undeniably, the Community process suffers from a clear
Democracy Deficit in the classical sense outlined above.
"Social legitimacy," on the other hand, connotes a broad, empirically deter-
mined societal acceptance of the system. Social legitimacy may have an
additional substantive component; legitimacy occurs when the government
process displays a commitment to, and actively guarantees, values that are part
of the general political culture, such as justice, freedom, and general
welfare.
18
An institution, system, or polity, in most, but not all, cases, must enjoy
formal legitimacy to enjoy social legitimacy. This is most likely the case in
Western Democratic traditions, which embody the Rule of Law as part of their
political ethos. But a system that enjoys formal legitimacy may not necessarily
enjoy social legitimacy. Most popular revolutions since the French Revolution
occurred in polities whose governments retained formal legitimacy but lost
social legitimacy.
These admittedly primitive distinctions will become relevant to our discus-
sion with one further excursus into the notions of integration and democra-
cy.18
9
Obviously, democracy cannot exist in a modern polity as in "the Greek
Polis" or "the New England town." Representative democracy replaces direct
but instead, reconfirmed the governance system.
188. Franck usefully sorts legitimacy theories into three groups. The first group regards legitimacy as
process. He cites Weber:
Weber postulates the validity of an order in terms of its being regarded by the obeying public
"as in some way obligatory or exemplary" for its members because, at least, in part, it defines
"a model" which is "binding" and to which the actions of others "will in fact conform .... At
least, in part, this legitimacy is perceived as adhering to the authority issuing an order, as opposed
to the qualities of legitimacy that inhere in an order itself.
T. FRANCK, supra note 181, at 16-18, 250 n.29 (quoting from M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 31 (1968)). The second group mixes process and substance. This
notion "is interested not only in how a ruler and a rule were chosen, but also in whether the rules made,
and commands given, were considered in the light of all relevant data, both objective and attitudinal." T.
FRANCK, supra note 181, at 17. Franck quotes Habermas: "Legitimacy means that there are good arguments
for a political order's claim to be recognized as right and just .... T. FRANCK, supra note 181, at 248
n.27 (quoting J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY .178-79 (1979)). His third
group, primarily neomarxist, focuses on outcomes. "In this view, a system seeking to validate itself...
must be defensible in terms of the equality, fairness, justice, and freedom which are realized by those
commands." T. FRANCK, supra note 11, at 18.
We do not have to choose among these different conceptualizations of legitimacy, since all three
support my simple proposition distinguishing social legitimacy from both democracy and legal validity
simpliciter.
189. See generally Dahl, supra note 181.
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participation. Nonetheless, democracy can be measured by the closeness,
responsiveness, representativeness, and accountability of the governors to the
governed. Although this formula is vague, it is sufficient for present purposes.
Imagine three independent polities, each enjoying a representative democra-
cy. Let us further assume that each government enjoys legislative and regulatory
power in the fields of education, taxation, foreign trade, and defense. In relation
to each of these four functions the electors can influence directly their represen-
tatives, through elections and the like, as to the polity's education policy, level
of taxation, type of foreign trade (e.g., protectionist or free), and defense force
composition and policy. Assume finally that for a variety of reasons the three
polities decide to integrate and "share their sovereignty" in the fields of taxa-
tion, foreign trade and defense.
If this decision to integrate was democratically reached within each polity,
the integrated polity certainly enjoys formal legitimacy. However, by definition,
initially the new integrated polity's "responsiveness" will be less than that of
the three independent polities. Prior to the integration, the majority of electors
in polity A would have a controlling influence over their level of taxation, the
nature of their foreign trade policy, and the size and posture of their army. In
the integrated polity, even a huge majority of the electors in polity A can be
outvoted by the electors of polities B and C.190 This will be the case even if
the new integrated polity has a perfectly democratically elected "federal"
legislator. The integrated polity will not be undemocratic but it will be, in terms
of the ability of citizens to influence policies affecting them, less democrat-
ic.
191
This transformation occurs, in reverse form, when a centralized state
devolves power to regions, as in the cases of Italy, Spain, and recently France.
Regionalism, "the division of sovereignty" and granting of it to more or less
autonomous regions is in some respects the opposite of integration. One of the
prime motivations for regionalism is to enhance democracy in the sense of
giving people more direct control of areas of public policy that affect their
lives.
To suggest that in the process of integration there is a loss, at least in one
sense, of democracy, does not, as such, condemn the process of integration. The
electors in polities A, B, and C usually have formidable reasons for integrating
despite this loss of some direct control over policy when it is made in the larger
polity. Typically the main reason is size. By aggregating their resources,
especially in the field of defense, total welfare may be enhanced despite the
loss of the more immediate influence of their government's policies. Similar
190. The dilution in Voice operates on two levels: a diminution in the specific gravity of each voter's
weight in the process, and a diminution in the gravity of each voter's state.
191. Different federal options will of course have consequences also for the allocation choices of voters
and substantive policy outcomes. For a sustained discussion of this issue, see Rose-Ackerman, Does
Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a Federal Republic, 89 J. POL. ECON. 152 (1981).
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advantages may accrue in the field of foreign trade. Phenomena such as multi-
national corporations, which may manage to escape the control of any particular
polity, may exist, and only an integrated polity can tax or regulate them effec-
tively. In other words the independence and sovereignty of the single polities
may be illusory in the real interdependent world. Nonetheless, the ability of the
citizens of polity A, B, or C directly to control and influence these areas will
have diminished.
Even within each polity the minority was obliged to accept majority deci-
sions. So why do I claim that in the enlarged, integrated polity, in which an
equally valid majoritarian rule applies, a loss of democracy occurs? This is
among the toughest aspects of democratic theory.
What defines the boundary of the polity within which the majority principle
should apply? No theoretical answer exists to this question. Long term, very
long term, factors such as political continuity, social, cultural, and linguistic
affinity, and a shared history determine the answer. No one factor determines
the boundaries; rather they result from some or all of these factors. People
accept the majoritarian principle of democracy within a polity to which they
see themselves as belonging.
92
The process of integration-even if decided upon democratically-brings
about at least a short-run loss of direct democracy in its actual process of
governance. What becomes crucial for the success of the integration process
is the social legitimacy of the new integrated polity despite this loss of total
control over the integrated policy areas by each polity.
How will such legitimacy emerge? Two answers are possible. The first is
a visible and tangible demonstration that the total welfare of the citizenry is
enhanced as a result of integration. The second answer is ensuring that the new
integrated polity itself, within its new boundaries, has democratic structures.
But more important still is giving a temporarily enhanced voice to the separate
polities. It is not an accident that some of the most successful federations which
emerged from separate polities-the United States, Switzerland, Ger-
many-enjoyed a period as a confederation prior to unification. This does not
mean confederation is a prerequisite to federation. It simply suggests that in
a federation created by integration, rather than by devolution, there must be an
adjustment period in which the political boundaries of the new polity become
socially accepted as appropriate for the larger democratic rules by which the
minority will accept a new majority.'93
192. "Thus it does not seem possible to arrive at a defensible conclusion about the proper unit of
democracy by strictly theoretical reasoning: we are in the domain not of theoretical reason but of practical
judgment." Dahl, supra note 181, at 106: see also L. BRILMAYER, supra note 181, at 13-27, 52-78 (ch. I,
"Political Legitimacy and Jurisdictional Boundaries" and ch. 3, "Boundary Assumptions in Domestic
Political Theory").
193. We do not have to take the formal transfer as the actual transfer. Arguably, the United States
became truly federal only after the Civil War.
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From the political, but not legal, point of view the Community is in fact
a confederation. The big debate is therefore whether the time is ripe for a
radical change toward a more federal structure, or whether the process should
continue in a more evolutionary fashion.
These answers about the possible emergence of legitimacy can be at odds
with each other. Giving an enhanced Voice to each polity may impede the
successful attainment of the goals of integration. Denying sufficient Voice to
the constituent polities (allowing the minority to be overridden by the majority)
may bring about a decline in the social legitimacy of the integrated polity with
consequent dysfunctions and even disintegration. In terms of democratic theory,
the final objective of a unifying polity is to recoup the loss of democracy
inherent in the process of integration. This "loss" is recouped when the social
fabric and discourse are such that the electorate accepts the new boundary of
the polity and then accepts totally the legitimacy-in its social dimension-of
being subjected to majority rule in a much larger system comprised of the
integrated polities.
We can now see how these notions play out in a reconstructed analysis of
the democracy issue in the Community.
As stated above, a premise of the traditional analysis is that the Community
suffers from a legitimacy crisis. Is the absence of legitimacy formal? Surely
not. The Community, including its weak Parliament, appointed Commission,
and unaccountable Council, enjoys perfect formal legitimacy. The Treaties all
have been approved by the Community electorate through their national parlia-
ments in accordance with the constitutional requirement of each Member State.
In addition, the Treaties have been approved several times more with the
accession of each new Member State and most recently with the adoption of
the Single European Act.
If there is a crisis of legitimacy it must therefore be a crisis of social
(empirical) legitimacy. What is the nature of this crisis of social legitimacy, if
indeed it exists?
The traditional view is that the absence of legitimacy is rooted in the
Democracy Deficit. As stated above, the implication is that any increase in the
legislative and control powers of the European Parliament at the expense of the
Council contributes to an elimination of this legitimacy crisis. I challenge the
premise and the conclusion. I believe that Parliament should be given enhanced
powers, because I acknowledge the Democracy Deficit in the formal sense
explained above. But I think that it is at least questionable whether this will
necessarily solve the legitimacy problems of the Community. It may even
enhance them.
The legitimacy problem is generated by several factors, which should be
discussed separately. The primary factor is, at least arguably, that the European
electorate (in most Member States) only grudgingly accepts the notion that
crucial areas of public life should be governed by a decisional process in which
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their national voice becomes a minority which can be overridden by a majority
of representatives from other European countries. In theoretical terms there is,
arguably, still no legitimacy to the notion that the boundaries within which a
minority will accept as democratically legitimate a majority decision are now
European instead of national. It is interesting, and significant, that for the first
time national parliaments are taking a keen interest in the structural process of
European integration and are far from enamored with the idea of solving the
Democracy Deficit by simply enhancing the powers of the European Parlia-
ment. 194
At its starkest, this critical view claims that in terms of social legitimacy
no difference exists between a decision of the Council of Ministers and a
decision of the European Parliament. To the electorate, both chambers present
themselves as legislative, composed of Member State's representatives. In both
cases, until time and other factors resolve this dimension of legitimacy, the
electorate of a minority Member State might consider it socially illegitimate
that they have to abide by a majority decision of a redefined polity.
On this view, the most legitimating element (from a "social" point of view)
of the Community was the Luxembourg Accord and the veto power. To be
sure, a huge cost in terms of efficient decisionmaking and progress was paid.
But this device enabled the Community to legitimate its program and its
legislation. It provided the national electorates an ex ante "insurance policy"
that nothing could pass without the electorate Voice having a controlling say.
The "insurance policy" also presented an ex post legitimation as well: every-
thing the Community did, no matter how unpopular, required the assent of
national ministers. The legitimacy of the output of the Community decisional
process was, thus, at least partially due to the public knowledge that it was
controllable through the veto power. The current shift to majority voting might
therefore exacerbate legitimacy problems. Even an enhanced European Parlia-
ment, which would operate on a co-decision principle, will not necessarily solve
the legitimacy problem. The legitimacy crisis does not derive principally from
the accountability issue at the European level, but from the very redefinition
of the European polity.
Pulling all the threads together, the conclusion provides at least food for
thought: in a formal sense, majority voting exacerbates the Democracy Deficit
by weakening national parliamentary control of the Council without increasing
the powers of the European Parliament. But even increasing the powers of the
European Parliament (to full co-decision on the most ambitious plan) does not
wholly solve the problem. It brings to the fore the intractable problem of
redefining the political boundaries of the Community within which the principle
of majority voting is to take place. It is an open question whether the necessary
194. See, e.g., Select Comm., supra note 173, at u 157, 158, 210.
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shift in public loyalty to such a redefined boundary has occurred even if we
accept the formalistic notion of state parliamentary democracy.
IV. BEYOND 1992: Two VISIONS OF THE PROMISED LAND-THE IDEOLO-
GY, ETHOS, AND POLITICAL CULTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
By way of conclusion I would like to examine, far more tentatively, another
facet of the transformation of Europe: the ideology, ethos, and political culture
of European integration, particularly in relation to 1992.195
Ideological discourse within the Community, especially in the pre-1992
period, had two peculiar features. On the one hand, despite the growing focus
of Community activity on important issues of social choice, a near absence of
overt debate on the left-right spectrum existed. 1992 (as a code for the overall
set of changes) represents a break from this pattern.
On the other hand, there was abundant discourse on the politics and choices
of the integration model itself. But this discourse was fragmented. In specialized
political constituencies, especially those concerned with Community gover-
nance, public discourse was typically a dichotomy between those favoring the
Community (and further European integration) and those defending "national
sovereignty" and the prerogatives of the Member State.
The outcome of the debate was curious. In the visible realm of political
power from the 1960's onwards, it seemed that the "national interest" was
ascending.1 96 The "high moral ground" by contrast, seemed to be occupied
fairly safely by the "integrationists."
So far as the general public was concerned, the characterizing feature of
public discourse was a relatively high level of indifference, disturbed only on
195. In the earlier parts of this Article I rested my interpretation, as much as possible and at least in
its factual matrix, on an "objective" reality rooted in "empirical" and consequently "refutable" data.
Likewise, my analytical moves were transparent enough to open them to rational critique. Obvious and
inevitable limitations on the resulting "scientific objectivity" of the Article exist. Clearly, to give the most
banal example, my own prejudices, overt and less overt, shaped the selection of factual data, and, of course,
their perception and analysis. Readers are always better placed than the writer to expose those prejudices
and discount them in assessing the overall picture.
In turning to ethos, ideology, and political culture, the screening process of the "self" (my "self") plays
an even bigger role in the narrative. To try to "document" my assertions and conclusions here would be
to employ the semblance of a scholarly apparatus where it is patently not merited. I do not, and cannot,
claim to root this part of the Article on the kind of painstaking research and complex tools that characterize
the work of the social historian or the historical sociologist. Caveat Lector! Nonetheless, my brief narrative
will, I hope, serve a function. Compared to the plethora of systemic and substantive theories and analyses
of the processes of European integration, a real dearth of ideological and cultural scrutiny exists. Two recent
extremely illuminating reflections on these issues are F. SNYDER, supra note 7, and J. 0RSTROM MOLLER,
TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE IN A EUROPEAN CONTEXT (199 1). By offering my perspective on these issues,
I hope the reader is drawn to reflect, and thereby, challenged to take position.
196. The constitutional revolution was not immediately apparent even to relatively informed audiences.
See Weiler, Attitudes of MEPs Towards the European Court, 9 EUR. L REV. 169 (1984). One of the
interesting conclusions of this survey of attitudes is that even those Members of the European Parliament
strongly opposed to the dynamics of European integration and the increase in power of the Commission
and Parliament regarded the Court with relevant equanimity.
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rare occasions when Community issues caught the public imagination. Although
opinion polls always showed a broad support for the Community, as I argued
earlier, it was still possible to gain political points by defending the national
interest against the threat of the faceless "Brussels Eurocracy."
Here, the importance of 1992 has not been only in a modification of the
political process of the Community, but also in a fascinating mobilization of
wide sections of general public opinion behind the "new" Europe. The signifi-
cance of this mobilization cannot be overstated. It fueled the momentum
generated by the White Paper and the Single European Act, and laid the ground
auspiciously for creating Community initiatives to push beyond 1992. These
Community initiatives included the opening in December 1990 of two new
Intergovernmental Conferences designed to fix the timetable and modalities of
Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the much more elusive task of
Political Union. Although no one has a clear picture of "political union," '197
with open talk about Community government, federalist solutions, and other
such codes, 198 even if the actual changes to the existing structure will be
disappointing, in the ideological "battle" between state and Community, the old
nationalist rhetoric has become increasingly marginalized and the integrationist
ethos has fully ascended. The demise of Prime Minister Thatcher symbolizes
this change.
The impact of 1992, however, goes well beyond these obvious facts of
mobilization and "European ascendancy." Just below the surface lurk some
questions, perhaps even forces, which touch the very ethos of European integra-
tion, its underlying ideology, and the emergent political culture associated with
this new mobilization. Moreover, in some respects the very success of 1992
highlights some inherent (or at least potential) contradictions in the very
objectives of European integration.
I shall deal first with the break from the Community's supposed ideological
neutrality, and then turn to the question of the ethos of European integration
in public discourse.
197. The term has no fixed meaning and is used to connote a wide variety of models from federalist
to intergovernmentalist. See generally, R. MAYNE & J. PINDER, FEDERAL UNION: THE PIONEERS (1990);
THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION (R. Pryce ed. 1987) (usefully tracing evolution of concept of political
union over history of European integration up to Single European Act); EUROPEAN UNION: THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY IN SEARCH OF A FUTURE (J. Lodge ed. 1986).
198. See, e.g., President Delors' speech to the European Parliament of January 17, 1990: "Cet exdcutif
[of the future Community on which Delors was speculating-the Commission according to the logic of the
Foundersi devra etre responsable, bien entendu, devant les institutions d6mocratique de la future
fideration ...." Jacques Delors Presente De Programme de la Commission et Dessine Un Profit de
L'Europe de Demain, EUROPE DOc. (No. 1592) 7 (Jan. 24, 1990) (emphasis added). Likewise, when
speaking approvingly of Mitterrand's idea of an "all European Confederation," Delors adds: "Mais ma
conviction est qu'une telle confederation ne pourra voir le jour qu'une fois rdalis6 l'Union politique de la
Communaut6!" Id. at 4.
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A. 1992 and. the "Ideological Neutrality" of the Community
The idea of the single market was presented in the White Paper as an
ideologically neutral program around which the entire European polity could
coalesce in order to achieve the goals of European integration. This idea
reflected an interesting feature of the pre-1992 Community: the relative absence
of ideological discourse and debate on the right-left spectrum. The chill on
right-left ideological debate derived from the governance structure of the
Community.t99
Since in the Council there usually would be representatives of national
governments from both right and left, the desired consensus had to be one
acceptable to all major political forces in Europe. Thus, policies verged towards
centrist pragmatic choices, and issues involving sharp right-left division were
either shelved2° or mediated to conceal or mitigate the choice involved. The
tendency towards the lowest common denominator applied also to ideology.
Likewise, on the surface, the political structure of the European Parliament
replicates the major political parties in Europe. National party lists join in
Parliament to sit in European political groups. However, for a long time the
politics of integration itself, especially on the issues of the European Parlia-
ment's power and the future destiny of the Community, were far more impor-
tant than differences between left and right within the chamber. The clearest
example was the coalescing of Parliament with a large majority behind the
Independent-Communist Spinelli and his Draft Treaty for European Union.0 t
Most interesting in this perspective is the perception of the Commission.
It is an article of faith for European integration that the Commission is not
meant to be a mere secretariat, but an autonomous political force shaping the
agenda and brokering the decisionmaking of the Community. And yet at the
same time, the Commission, as broker, must be ideologically neutral, not
favoring Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, or others.
This neutralization of ideology has fostered the belief that an agenda could
be set for the Community, and the Community could be led towards an ever
closer union among its peoples, without having to face the normal political
cleavages present in the Member States. In conclusion, the Community political
culture which developed in the 1960's and 1970's led both the principal
political actors and the political classes in Europe to an habituation of all
political forces to thinking of European integration as ideologically neutral in,
or ideologically transcendent over, the normal debates on the left-right spec-
199. Of course I do not suggest that choices with ideological implications were not made. But they
were rarely perceived as such.
200. Thus, the proposed European company statute was shelved for many years because of the inability
to agree, especially on the role of labor in the governance structure of the company.
201. Typically, right and left have differed sharply in Parliament on issues of foreign affairs and extra-
Community policies.
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trum. It is easy to understand how this will have served the process of integra-
tion, allowing a nonpartisan coalition to emerge around its overall objectives.
1992 changes this in two ways. The first is a direct derivation from the turn
to majority voting. Policies can be adopted now within the Council that run
counter not simply to the perceived interests of a Member State, but more
specifically to the ideology of a government in power. The debates about the
European Social Charter and the shrill cries of "Socialism through the back-
door," as well as the emerging debate about Community adherence to the
European Convention on Human Rights and abortion rights are harbingers of
things to come. In many respects this is a healthy development, since the real
change from the past is evidenced by the ability to make difficult social choices
and particularly by the increased transparency of the implications of the choice.
At the same time, it represents a transformation from earlier patterns with
obvious dysfunctional tensions.
The second impact of 1992 on ideological neutrality is subtler. The entire
program rests on two pivots: the single market plan encapsulated in the White
Paper, and its operation through the new instrumentalities of the Single Europe-
an Act. Endorsing the former and adopting the latter by the Community and
its Member States-and more generally by the political class in Europe-was
a remarkable expression of the process of habituation alluded to above. People
were successfully called to rally behind and identify with a bold new step
toward a higher degree of integration. A "single European market" is a concept
which still has the power to stir. But it is also a "single European market." It
is not simply a technocratic program to remove the remaining obstacles to the
free movement of all factors of production. It is at the same time a highly
politicized choice of ethos, ideology, and political culture: the culture of "the
market." It is also a philosophy, at least one version of which-the predominant
version-seeks to remove barriers to the free movement of factors of produc-
tion, and to remove distortion to competition as a means to maximize utility.
The above is premised on the assumption of formal equality of individuals.
20 2
It is an ideology the contours of which have been the subject of intense debate
within the Member States in terms of their own political choices. This is not
the place to explicate these. Elsewhere, two slogans, "The One Dimensional
Market" and "Big Market as Big Brother," have been used to emphasize the
fallacy of ideological neutrality. 3 Thus, for example, open access, the corner-
stone of the single market and the condition for effective nonprotectionist
competition, will also put pressure on local consumer products in local markets
to the extent these are viewed as an expression of cultural diversity. Even more
202. There is an alternative construction of the Community political ideology also present in the
European debate, one which recognizes "inequalities but deploring their inequities, considers the market
to be just one of several basic means of governing society." F. SNYDER, supra note 7, at 89.
203. Bieber, Dehousse, Pinder & Weiler, Back to the Future: Policy, Strategy and Tactics of the White
Paper on the Creation of a Single European Market, in 1992: ONE EUROPEAN MARKET? 18-20 (1988).
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dramatic will be the case in explicit "cultural products," such as television and
cinema. The advent of Euro-brands has implications, for better or for worse,
which extend beyond the bottom line of national and Community economies.
A successful single market requires widespread harmonization of standards of
consumer protection and environmental protection, as well as the social package
of employees. This need for a successful market not only accentuates the
pressure for uniformity, but also manifests a social (and hence ideological)
choice which prizes market efficiency and European-wide neutrality of competi-
tion above other competing values.
It is possible that consensus may be found on these issues, and indeed that
this choice enjoys broad legitimacy. From my perspective, it is important to
highlight that the consensus exudes a powerful pressure in shaping the political
culture of the Community. As such, it is an important element of the transfor-
mation of Europe.
B. The Ethos of European Integration: Europe as Unity and Europe as Com-
munity
As indicated above, 1992 also brings to the fore questions, choices, and
contradictions in the very ethos of European integration. I shall explore these
questions, choices, and contradictions by construing two competing visions of
the Promised Land to which the Community is being led in 1992 and beyond.
The two visions are synthetic constructs, distilled from the discourse and praxis
of European integration.
Unitarian and communitarian visions share a similar departure point. If we
go back in time to the 1950 Schuman Declaration and the consequent 1951
Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, these
events, despite their economic content, are best seen as a long-term and
transformative strategy for peace among the states of Western Europe, principal-
ly France and Germany.2' This strategy tried to address the "mischief" em-
bodied in the excesses of the modern nation-state and the traditional model of
statal intercourse among them that was premised on full "sovereignty," "autono-
my," "independence," and a relentless defense and maximization of the national
interest. This model was opposed not simply because, at the time, it displayed
a propensity to degenerate into violent clashes, but also because it was viewed
as unattractive for the task of reconstruction in times of peace. 05 The Europe-
204. See, e.g., Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, reprinted in 13 BuLL. EUR. CONI IuNmES 14,
15 (1980) [hereinafter Schuman Declaration] ("The gathering of the nations of Europe requires the
elimination of the age-old opposition of France and the Federal Republic of Germany."); Preamble to 1951
Treaty of Paris, reprinted in EuR. COMMUNITY INFO. SERVICE, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUR.
CoMvMIJNmE (1987) ("Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensu-
rate with the dangers that threaten it .. .
205. This does not mean that states and leaders were engulfed in some teary-eyed sentimentalism.
Signing on to the Community idea was no doubt also a result of cool calculation of the national interest.
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an Community was to be an antidote to the negative features of the state and
statal intercourse; its establishment in 1951 was seen as the beginning of a pro-
cess' ° that would bring about their elimination.
At this point, the two visions depart.
According to the first-unity-vision, the process that started in 1951 was
to move progressively through the steps of establishing a common market and
approximating economic policies 7 through ever tighter economic integration
(economic and monetary union), resulting, finally, in full political union, in
some version of a federal United States of Europe. If we link this vision to
governance process and constitutional structure, the ultimate model of the
Community and the constitutionalized treaties stands as the equivalent, in the
European localized context, of the utopian model of "world government" in
classical international law. Tomorrow's Europe in this form would indeed
constitute the final demise of Member State nationalism and, thus, the ultimate
realization of the original objectives through political union in the form of a
federalist system of governance.208
The alternative-community-vision also rejects the classical model of
international law which celebrates statal sovereignty, independence, and autono-
my and sees international legal regulation providing a "neutral" arena for states
to prosecute their own ("national") goals premised on power and self-inter-
est.2' The community vision is, instead, premised on limiting, or sharing,
sovereignty in a select albeit growing number of fields, on recognizing, and
even celebrating, the reality of interdependence, and on counterpoising to the
exclusivist ethos of statal autonomy a notion of a community of states and
peoples sharing values and aspirations.
Most recently, it has been shown convincingly, not for the first time, how
the classical model of international law is a replication at the international level
of the liberal theory of the state.2t0 The state is implicitly treated as the ana-
logue, on the international level, to the individual within a domestic situation.
In this conception, international legal notions such as self-determination,
See A. MILWARD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WESTERN EUROPE 1945-51 (1984). But this does not diminish
the utility of seeking the overall ethos of the enterprise that they were joining.
206. On the one hand: "In taking upon [itiself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united
Europe, France has always had as [its] essential aim the service of peace." On the other hand: "Europe will
not be made all at once, or according to a single. . . plan." Schuman Declaration, supra note 204, at 15.
207. EEC Treaty, art. 2.
208. Of course, even in this vision, one is not positing a centrist unified Europe but a federal structure
of sorts, in which, local interests and diversity would be maintained. Thus, although Delors speaks in his
Oct. 17, 1990, speech of Europe as federation, he is-in good faith-always careful to maintain respect
for "pluralism." See Jacques Delors at the College of Europe In Bruges, reprinted in EUROPE Doc. (No.
1576) 1, 5 (Oct. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Delors Speech of Oct. 17, 1990].
209. This, of course, is the classical model of international law. It is not monolithic. There are, in
international law, voices, from both from within and without, calling for an alternative vision expressed in
such notions as "common heritage of humankind." See, e.g., P. SANDS, LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (World Resources Inst., 1990).
210. M. KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, at XVI passim (1989).
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sovereignty, independence, and consent have their obvious analogy in theories
of the individual within the state. The idea of community is thus posited in
juxtaposition to the international version of pure liberalism and substitutes a
modified communitarian vision.
Since the idea of "community" is currently in vogue and has become many
things to many people, I would like to explain the meaning I attach to it in this
transnational European context. 21' The importance of the EEC inter-statal
notion of community rests on the very fact that it does not involve a negation
of the state. It is neither state nor community. The idea of community seeks
to dictate a different type of intercourse among the actors belonging to it, a type
of self-limitation in their self-perception, a redefined self-interest, and, hence,
redefined policy goals. To the interest of the state must be added the interest
of the community. But crucially, it does not extinguish the separate actors who
are fated to live in an uneasy tension with two competing senses of the polity's
self, the autonomous self and the self as part of a larger community, and
committed to an elusive search for an optimal balance of goals and behavior
between the community and its actors. I say it is crucial because the unique
contribution of the European Community to the civilization of international
relations-indeed its civilizing effect on intra-European statal inter-
course-derives from that very tension among the state actors and between each
state actor and the Community. It also derives from each state actor's need to
reconcile the reflexes and ethos of the "sovereign" national state with new
modes of discourse and a new discipline of solidarity.212 Civilization is thus
perceived not in the conquering of Eros but in its taming.213
Moreover, the idea of Europe as community not only conditions discourse
among states, but it also spills over to the peoples of the states, influencing
relations among individuals. For example, the Treaty provisions prohibiting
discrimination on grounds of nationality, allowing the free movement of
workers and their families, and generally supporting a rich network of transna-
tional social transactions may be viewed not simply as creating the optimal
conditions for the free movement of factors of production in the common
market. They also serve to remove nationality and state affiliation of the
211. I certainly do not find it useful to make an explicit analogy to the theories of community of
domestic society, although I would not deny their influence on my thinking. See, e.g., M. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIM rTs OF JUSTICE (1982); M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983), and the fierce
debates about these, see, e.g., Dworkin, To Each His Own, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Apr. 14, 1983;
Spheres of Justice: an Exchange, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, July 21, 1983.
212. Cf. EEC Treaty, art. 5.
213. This tension between actor and community finds evocative expression in the Preamble and opening
Article of the EEC Treaty, the foundation of the current Community. The Preamble speaks of "an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe" (emphasis added) whereas Article 2 speaks of "closer relations between
the States belonging to it" (emphasis added). Note, too, that the Preamble speaks about the peoples, of
Europe rejecting any notion of a melting pot and nation-building. Finally, note the "ever closer union":
something which goes on for "ever" incorporates, of course, the "never." See EEC Treaty, preamble.
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individual, so divisive in the past, as the principal referent for transnational
human intercourse.
The unity vision of the Promised Land sees then as its "ideal type" a
European polity, finally and decisively replacing its hitherto warring Member
States with a political union of federal governance. The community vision sees
as its "ideal type" a political union in which Community and Member State
continue their uneasy co-existence, although with an ever-increasing embrace.
It is important also to understand that the voice of, say, Thatcher is not an
expression of this community vision. Thatcherism is one pole of the first vision,
whereby Community membership continues to be assessed and re-evaluated in
terms of its costs and benefits to a Member State, in this case Great Britain,
which remains the ultimate referent for its desirability. The Community is
conceived in this way of thinking not as a redefinition of the national self but
as an arrangement, elaborate and sophisticated, of achieving long-term maximi-
zation of the national interest in an interdependent world. Its value is measured
ultimately and exclusively with the coin of national utility and not community
solidarity.
I do not think that 1992 can be seen as representing a clear preference and
choice for one vision over the other. But there are manifestations, both explicit
and implicit, suggesting an unprecedented and triumphal resurgence and
ascendancy of the unity vision of Europe over the competing vision of com-
munity: part and parcel of the 1992 momentum. If indeed the road to European
union is to be paved on this unity vision, at the very moment of ascendancy
the Community endangers something noble at its very core and, like other great
empires, with the arrival of success may sow the seeds of self-destruction.
Why such foreboding? Whence the peril in the unity vision?
At an abstract logical level it is easy to challenge the unity vision which
sets up a fully united Europe as the pinnacle of the process of European
integration. It would be more than ironic if a polity with its political process
set up to counter the excesses of statism ended up coming round full circle and
transforming itself into a (super) state. It would be equally ironic that an ethos
that rejected the nationalism of the Member States gave birth to a new Europe-
an nation and European nationalism. The problem with the unity vision is that
its very realization entails its negation.
But the life of the Community (like some other things) is not logic, but
experience. And experience suggests that with all the lofty talk of political
union and federalism we are not about to see the demise of the Member States,
at least not for a long time. The reports leaking out of the intergovernmental
conference suggest fairly modest steps on this road.
That being the case, the unease with the unity vision nonetheless remains.
For if the unity ethos becomes the principal mobilizing force of the polity, it
may, combined with the praxis and rhetoric of the 1992 single market, compro-
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mise the deeper values inherent in the community vision, even if the Communi-
ty's basic structure does not change for years to come.
I suggested above that these values operated both at the interstate level by
conditioning a new type of statal discourse and self-perception and at the
societal and individual level by diminishing the importance of nationality in
transnational human intercourse. How then would the unity vision and the 1992
praxis and rhetoric corrode these values?
The successful elimination of internal frontiers will, of course, accentuate
in a symbolic and real sense the external frontiers of the Community. The
privileges of Community membership for states and of Community citizenship
for individuals are becoming increasingly pronounced. This is manifest in such
phenomena as the diffidence of the Community towards further enlargement
(packaged in the notion of the concentric circles),214 in the inevitable harmo-
nization of external border controls, immigration, and asylum policies, and in
policies such as local European content of television broadcasting regulation.
It assumes picaresque character with the enhanced visibility of the statal
symbols already adopted by the Community: flag, anthem, Community passport.
The potential corrosive effect on the values of the community vision of Europe-
an integration are self-evident. Nationality as referent for interpersonal relations,
and the human alienating effect of Us and Them are brought back again, simply
transferred from their previous intra-Community context to the new inter-
Community one. We have made little progress if the Us becomes European
(instead of German or French or British) and the Them becomes those outside
the Community or those inside who do not enjoy the privileges of citizenship.
There is a second, slightly more subtle, potentially negative influence in this
realm. A centerpiece of the agenda for further integration is the need of Europe
to develop the appropriate structures for a common foreign and defense poli-
cy.z15 It has indeed been anomalous that despite the repeated calls since the
early 1970's for a Europe that will speak with one voice, 216 the Community
has never successfully translated its internal economic might to commensurate
outside influence. There could be much positive in Europe taking such a step
to an enhanced common foreign and security policy. The potential corrosive
element of this inevitable development rests in the suspicion that some of the
harkening for a common foreign policy is the appeal of strength and the vision
of Europe as a new global superpower. Europe is a political and economic
superpower and often fails to see this and discharge its responsibilities appropri-
ately. But the ethos of strength and power, even if transferred from the Member
214. See Delors Speech of Oct. 17, 1990, supra note 208.
215. Id.; see also Proposals of European Parliament to Intergovernmental Conference, PE 146.824, new
art. 130u (proposing full-fledged apparatus for European foreign and security policy).
216. On the history of European Political Cooperation and the idea of Europe speaking with one voice,
see Stein, supra note 4.
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State to the European level, is closer to the unity rather than community notion
of Europe and, as such, partakes of the inherent contradiction of that vision.
All these images and the previous question marks are not intended as an
indictment of 1992 and the future road of European integration. Both in its
structure and process, and, in part, its ethos, the Community has been more than
a simple successful venture in transnational cooperation and economic integra-
tion. It has been a unique model for reshaping transnational discourse among
states, peoples, and individuals who barely a generation ago emerged from the
nadir of Western civilization. It is a model with acute relevance for other
regions of the world with bleak histories or an even bleaker present.
Today's Community is impelled forward by the dysfunctioning of its current
architecture. The transformation that is taking place has immense, widely
discussed promise. If I have given some emphasis to the dangers, it is not
simply to redress a lacuna in the literature. It is also in the hope that as this
transformation takes place, that part, limited as it may be, of the Community
that can be characterized as the modern contribution of Europe to the civiliza-
tion of interstatal and intrastatal intercourse shall not be laid by the wayside.
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